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Preface 
 
 
 
In recent years, multilateral trade negotiations have occupied centre stage in economic 
policy discussions in the African region. This reflects partly the emerging consensus that 
trade has an important role to play in the economic development of the region. It also 
reflects the understanding that African countries have to be more active in trade 
negotiations in order to protect their interests. Information is the key to effective 
participation in the Doha Development Agenda. This paper provides a quantitative 
estimate of the potential economic consequences of multilateral trade reform for Africa 
using a framework that explicitly incorporates issues of concern to the region, such as 
preference erosion, loss of tariff revenue, and trade facilitation. It is the result of a 
cooperation of staff of the Trade and Regional Integration Division, United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Addis Ababa, and researchers of the 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), The Hague, The Netherlands. The study 
benefited from contributions by Mr H.J. Kelholt, Dr M. Lips and Dr C. Mwalwanda. 
Preliminary results were presented in a seminar at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The 
Netherlands at 26 February 2004, in The Hague. The authors thank the participants for 
their opinions on the work. 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. L.C. Zachariasse 
Director General LEI B.V. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
The key development challenge facing the African region is how to reduce poverty through 
sustained economic growth. There is an emerging consensus that trade, if well managed, 
could play an important role in confronting this challenge. This fact has been recognised 
by African countries as evidenced by the fact that they are beginning to show more interest 
in multilateral trade negotiations. They are, however, concerned that they have not been 
able to derive substantial benefits from trade due in part to the protective agricultural 
policies and trading practices of OECD countries.  
 This study provides a quantitative estimate of the potential economic consequences 
of multilateral trade reform for Africa using a framework that explicitly incorporates issues 
of concern to the region, such as preference erosion, loss of tariff revenue, and trade 
facilitation. It also examines the impact of OECD agricultural support programmes on 
Africa and provides an idea of the relative importance for Africa of the three pillars in the 
Doha round negotiations on agriculture, with a view to assisting African trade officials in 
ranking their priorities in the negotiations.  
 The study is based on the GTAP (Global Trade Policy Analysis) model, which is a 
multi-sector and multi-region general equilibrium model widely used by trade analysts to 
examine the impact of trade policies. It focuses on the impact of reforms at the sub-
regional level for North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern Africa. The focus on 
sub-regional, as opposed to country level, impacts can be ascribed to the fact that most 
African countries are not in the GTAP database and so it is not possible to conduct country 
level analysis. That said, to the extent that groups of countries have similar structures and 
trading patterns, the results could be used to draw general inferences on how the reforms 
might affect individual countries.  
 Three trade reform scenarios, capturing different degrees of trade liberalisation, are 
considered. These are 'little', 'modest,' and 'full' trade liberalisation scenarios. In the static 
version of the model, the study finds that full liberalisation of trade would increase global 
welfare (income) by 0.3 per cent, but would add 0.7 per cent annually to income in the 
African region. The gains to Africa may seem modest but is significant given the fact that 
the region's share of the global welfare gain is 5 per cent while its share of global output is 
about 2 per cent. The study also suggests that the gains from liberalisation grow with the 
depth of reforms. While North Africa benefits from all liberalisation scenarios, sub-
Saharan Africa and Southern Africa incur losses when partial liberalisation is carried out. 
This is largely due to the combined impact of preference erosion and binding overhang. 
Several countries in the two African sub-regions are major beneficiaries of preferential 
trading arrangements and partial market access reforms increase the degree of competition 
they face in export markets. But because of binding overhangs, partial reforms do not yield 
any significant improvement in market access for exports of countries in the two African 
sub-regions. 
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 Another interesting finding of the study is that reforms force African countries to 
specialise more in the production of agricultural commodities. In particular, they result in 
the contraction of industrial activities in the region and a shift of resources into the 
production of commodities such as grains, sugar, and cotton. Although this change in the 
pattern of specialisation is dictated by comparative advantage, it is worrisome because 
excessive dependence on commodities increases the degree of vulnerability faced by the 
region.  
 Regarding the three pillars of the negotiations on agriculture - market access, 
domestic support, and export competition - the study finds that, in terms of welfare gains, 
market access and domestic support are important for countries in North and Southern 
Africa. More specifically, under the full liberalisation scenario, North Africa derives 
welfare gains of USD 578 and 595 million from more market access and reductions in 
domestic support respectively. For Southern Africa the gains are USD 336 and 449 
million. Turning to sub-Saharan Africa, market access yields the largest benefits to the 
sub-region. The gain from this source is three times larger than the gain from domestic 
support. Furthermore, North Africa incurs losses from reductions in export subsidies - 
because it is a net importer of subsidised commodities - while the other sub-regions do not 
reap any significant benefits. With respect to Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), 
the study finds that the African region is vulnerable to partial reforms in this area due 
largely to the loss of tariff revenue. 
 On trade facilitation, the study suggests that all African regions stand to derive 
benefits from reforms in this area. This result should, however, be interpreted with caution 
because the study does not incorporate the implementation costs associated with trade 
facilitation. To the extent that these are large, the net benefits to African may not be 
positive. The results also suggest that unilateral trade facilitation by other developing 
countries and transition economies without any reciprocal actions by African countries will 
lead to welfare losses in the African region.  
 When the model is modified to allow for dynamic effects, the study finds that there is 
a substantial increase in the benefits of trade reforms to all regions of the world. For the 
sub-Saharan Africa region, the welfare gains from full liberalisation increases from USD 
704 million in the static model to USD 4.3 billion in the dynamic model. That is, the gain 
to sub-Saharan Africa in the dynamic model is about six times as large as in the static 
model. The huge welfare gain from the dynamic model is associated with the impact of 
capital accumulation. The results therefore emphasise the importance of complementing 
trade liberalisation with investment enhancing policies. 
 What are the implications of our results for the current round of multilateral trade 
negotiations? Clearly, the most important result that has serious implications for 
negotiations under the Doha round is the idea that countries in sub-Saharan Africa and, to a 
lesser extent, Southern Africa, are vulnerable to partial trade reforms. Since other regions 
of the world derive positive gains from partial reforms and it is unlikely that there will be 
complete liberalisation in the current round of negotiations, the results underscore the need 
for development issues to be taken more seriously in the negotiations. Consequently, to 
ensure that partial reforms do not have serious adverse effects on the African region, WTO 
members need to find appropriate mechanisms to make special and differential treatment a 
more effective instrument for development in Africa and other least developed countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
The protection of agricultural markets remains a topic that seems to divide developing 
countries and member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Renegotiations of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) were to bring parties together, but little 
headway has been made so far. Between the two rounds of WTO-talks, OECD countries 
have been reluctant to phase out support to their farmers. For Africa, so much affected by 
distortions in agricultural markets, this is a major disappointment.  
 In response to the limited progress that has been made in the current Doha round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, African countries have increased their calls for fair trade 
practices and are beginning to show more interest in multilateral trade negotiations. Trade 
negotiation is a bargaining game. This has several implications. First, there is the need to 
bring ranked priorities to the negotiation table, preferably based on calculated gains and 
losses from various outcomes to the economy. Understanding the impact of various 
methods of trade liberalisation is important if an economy is to maximise its gains from the 
process. This is particularly critical in the negotiations on agriculture where the so-called 
'modalities' have a large influence on the likely outcome of the process. Second, there is 
the need for countries with similar interests to unite and seek common positions on some 
of the issues in order to gain negotiating power. Since the onset of the Doha round, several 
developing countries have been quite effective in joining umbrella groups to defend their 
key interests. For example, some African countries are members of the G20+ and the 
Cairns group of agricultural commodity exporters pushing for more rapid reform of 
agricultural trade. There has also been an increase in efforts by African countries to form 
common positions on key issues under the DDA so as to maximise their gains from the 
negotiation process.  
 One of the challenges facing African countries in the Doha round of negotiations is 
how to deal with the lack of capacity to conduct research on the impact of various 
proposals in the negotiations on their economies. This study is one in a series of recent 
efforts that have been made to identify the consequences of the DDA for African countries 
(see, for example, Iancovichina et al., 2001; and Kerkelä et al., 2000).1 It has two main 
objectives. The first is to provide a quantitative estimate of the potential economic benefits 
that could accrue to Africa from multilateral trade reform using a framework that explicitly 
incorporates issues of concern to the region, such as preference erosion, loss of tariff 
revenue, and trade facilitation.2 The second objective is to provide an idea of the relative 
importance for Africa of the three pillars in the agriculture negotiations so as to assist 
African trade officials in ranking their priorities in the negotiations. The framework used in 
the analysis is the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, which is a computable 
                                                 
1 See also Francois et al. (2003a), International Monetary Fund (2002), IFPRI (2003, forthcoming) and 
Anderson et al. (2001) for recent applications of the GTAP model to the Doha round.  
2 See Amjadi et al. (1996) for a broad outline of trade policy issues for Africa. 
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general equilibrium model used by trade analysts throughout the world. It is a model of the 
global economy, which allows the analyst to incorporate relations between all sectors of an 
economy in all countries of the world.  
 The study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, the model used 
for the analysis incorporates unemployment of unskilled labour, which is a very important 
feature of African countries. Throughout the analysis it is assumed that unskilled labour 
may enter the wage economy when this factor of production is in demand, while demand 
for skilled labour responds to changes in the wage rate. 
 Second, the study estimates trade and welfare in Africa under a mid-term baseline 
run that reflects the altered policy landscape in which Doha outcomes are to be 
implemented eventually. The baseline includes full implementation of Uruguay Round 
commitments and the Agenda 2000 measures of the EU Common Agricultural Policy. It 
also assumes the full phase-out of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (Multi Fibre 
Agreement) and the integration of China into the WTO. Trade reforms of varying degrees 
of comprehensiveness are simulated, and the welfare effects for Africa are measured as 
deviations from the baseline. 
 Third, substantial effort was made to incorporate preferential trade conditions in the 
tariff data, as well as differences between bound levels and applied rates. Many African 
countries are major beneficiaries of trade preferences, and the erosion of preferences under 
a global liberalisation of border measures is of concern to them. It is shown that this effect 
is intertwined with binding overhang. Both features moderate the gains from trade reform, 
and make beneficiaries of preferences vulnerable to partial reforms.  
 Finally, the policy experiments conducted in the study are based on the key interests 
of Africa in the Doha round. Emphasis is on the relative importance of the three pillars of 
the agriculture negotiations (market access, export competition and domestic support), 
non-agricultural market access as it relates to manufactures, and trade facilitation.  
 The study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the role of trade in addressing 
the major development challenges facing the continent while chapter 3 presents an 
overview of Africa's position in global trade. Chapter 4 outlines the trade policy landscape 
for Africa, with emphasis on the 'three pillars' in the agriculture negotiations, market access 
formula, and the incorporation of trade preferences. Chapter 4 also presents the views of 
African countries on agricultural negotiations. The data, model, and policy scenarios used 
in the study are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains the results of the analysis. The 
concluding chapter analyses the implications of the results for Africa and the Doha round 
of trade negotiations. 
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2. Trade and African Development 
 
 
 
2.1 The challenge of African development 
 
When African nations gained political independence in the 1960s, they had so much 
promise. With abundant natural resources, fertile lands, low population density, and a 
growing and vibrant labour force, there was the conviction that if African leaders create a 
political, social and economic environment conducive to growth, and take appropriate 
measures to ensure that the benefits trickle down to the poor, there would be a marked 
improvement in living standards on the continent. 
 To date, however, Africa's promise has not yet been realised and this is reflected in 
the fact that the economic performance of the region is poor given its resource endowments 
and also relative to other developing countries. Table 2.1 shows that over the period 1981-
90, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita fell by 1.2 per cent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). In East Asia and Pacific countries it rose by 5.7 per cent while in South Asia 
it rose by 3.5 per cent. The only two regions that had negative growth rates as in SSA were 
the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, although the 
decline in these regions was not as large as in SSA. The poor performance of SSA relative 
to the other developing countries is even more pronounced when we look at the growth 
rates over the 1991-2000 period when real GDP per capita fell by 0.4 per cent in SSA but 
rose in all other regions: in East Asia and Pacific countries the growth rate was 6.4 per 
cent; in Latin America and the Caribbean it was 1.6 per cent; in the Middle East and North 
Africa it was 1 per cent; and in South Asia it was 3.2 per cent (World Bank, 2003). 
 
 
Table 2.1 Growth Rate of Real GDP per capita in Africa 1981-2000 (annual average) 
 
 
 1981-1990 1991-2000 
 
 
East Asia and Pacific 5.7 6.4 
Latin America and Caribbean -0.9 1.6 
Middle East and North Africa -0.6 1.0 
South Asia 3.5 3.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.2 -0.4 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2003). 
 
 
 Various explanations have been adduced for this dismal economic performance 
ranging from poor domestic policies and geography to colonial legacy and an inhospitable 
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external environment.3 However, an important fact that has emerged out of the debate on 
Africa's growth and development experience is that reducing poverty through sustainable 
growth is the primary development challenge facing the continent. African countries have 
recognised this challenge and are also taking measures to confront them. Since the 1990s 
there has been an improvement in economic policy design and implementation in the 
region. In addition, several countries have made significant progress toward strengthening 
macroeconomic stability and reinvigorating economic growth. Available data indicate that 
this has led to a modest improvement in economic performance. For example, in SSA 
average annual real GDP growth increased from 2 per cent in the period 1984-93 to 3.7 per 
cent over the period 1996-2001 and average annual inflation fell from 24.3 per cent to 15.9 
per cent within the same period. Furthermore, overall fiscal deficits as a percentage of 
GDP dropped from a peak of 9 per cent in 1992 to 2 per cent in 2001. 
 While the recent gain in economic performance in the region is welcome, its 
sustainability is in doubt due largely to the adverse economic effects of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, the continued marginalisation of Africa in the global economy, and the inability 
to find far-reaching solutions to the problems created by political instability, brain drain, 
and high external debt.  
 HIV/AIDS is the most serious development problem facing Africa today. The 
relatively modest development achievements of the region in the later half of the 1990s are 
slowly being reversed because of the devastating economic effects of the epidemic. Studies 
suggest that two-third of people living with HIV are in Africa. Furthermore, in Cameroon, 
Kenya, Swaziland, Zambia, and the United Republic of Tanzania, it is estimated that there 
would be a decline in GDP of about 25 per cent over 20 years as a result of the epidemic 
(International Labour Office, 2000). The HIV/AIDS epidemic increases health and social 
security costs thereby having a negative effect on savings and growth. It also increases the 
cost of doing business, lowers productivity, and as a consequence reduces foreign direct 
investment. Given the negative impact of the disease on human capital formation, it is 
becoming clear that Africa's long-term growth prospects will be affected by the extent to 
which its leaders are able to lift the constraints imposed by the epidemic. Unless this issue 
is dealt with swiftly and effectively, accelerating growth in the region will remain a 
daunting task, and increasing the standard of living a mirage.  
 The marginalisation of Africa in the global economy is another problem threatening 
the sustainability of growth as well as poverty reduction efforts in the region. Over the last 
three decades, there were sharp declines in the share of the region in global trade and 
foreign direct investment flows. The region's share of world exports fell from 4.6 per cent 
in 1980 to 1.8 per cent in 2000. Its share of world imports declined from 3.6 per cent to 1.6 
per cent over the same period. Furthermore, Africa's share of global inward FDI flows fell 
from 1.8 per cent in the period 1986-90 to 0.8 per cent over the period 1999-2000. These 
figures are well below the developing countries average of 17.5 per cent and 17.9 per cent 
over the same period. The low integration of the region into the global economy and the 
fact that it has not derived any significant benefits from world trade and investment has led 
to concerns that the region may be left behind in the globalisation process. 
                                                 
3 Despite the controversy created by attempts to provide explanations for the region's economic problems, it 
is clear that internal and external factors played a role. The unresolved issue is the relative importance of 
internal as opposed to external factors. 
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 Political instability continues to weaken and jeopardise the prospects for sustainable 
economic growth in the region. In Africa political instability often takes the form of wars 
as well as ethnic and religious conflicts. Studies have shown that political instability has a 
statistically significant negative effect on growth. Political instability can affect growth 
through its adverse effect on savings, investment, human capital formation, and the 
development of infrastructure as well as institutions needed to support the development 
process. 
 Brain drain is another problem inhibiting sustainable development in the region. 
Human capital is vital for sustained growth. But Africa continues to loose an increasing 
number of its educated people to developed countries. Available data indicate that about 
one-third of the professionals born in Africa live abroad. Furthermore, according to the 
International Organisation for Migration (1999), more than 35 per cent of college 
graduates in 40 per cent of countries in the region reside abroad. These migrants leave in 
search of better pay and or living conditions but their departure results in skill shortages, as 
well as reductions in output and tax revenue. They therefore rob the continent of a vital and 
scarce resource needed for sustainable development. Proponents of migration often point to 
the fact that these negative effects of emigration are dampened by the inflow of remittances 
from migrant workers. It is true that remittances have a positive impact in the region. For 
example, a recent publication of the World Bank (2003) shows Sub-Saharan Africa 
received USD 4 billion in remittances in 2002 and this represents about 1.3 per cent of the 
region's GDP. However, it is not clear that these benefits offset the costs to the society 
arising from the fact that a significant proportion of migrants received highly subsidised 
technical education funded through the domestic tax system.  
 High external debt continues to dampen as well as constrain the prospects for 
economic recovery and sustained growth in the region. In 2001, total external debt of SSA 
was USD 203 billion (World Bank, 2003). Of this amount, USD 32.1 represented short-
term debt while medium and long-term debt accounted for USD 170.9 billion. High 
external debt increases country risk and hence the cost of borrowing to domestic investors 
with adverse consequences for investment. Furthermore, the need to service debt diverts 
resources from important development projects thereby threatening the ability of African 
countries to achieve their poverty reduction goals. 
 It is increasingly being recognised that the problems facing the continent cannot be 
solved in isolation. Consequently, there is a need for the international community to be 
more involved and engaged in the dialogue on how to free the continent from the shackles 
of poverty.  
 
 
2.2 Confronting Africa's development challenges through trade 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, African countries were very sceptical about the virtues of free 
trade. Since the late 1980s, they have shown more interest in multilateral trade as well as 
negotiations. This reflects the combined effect of three factors: dissatisfaction with the 
slow pace of regional integration; the belief that trade, if well managed, could play a 
critical role in confronting the development challenges facing the continent; and the 
widespread view that multilateral trade could promote as well as spur up regional  
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integration efforts in the region. By increasing competition, multilateral trade liberalisation 
could force African governments to intensify regional integration efforts so as to reduce 
transactions costs through the development of regional infrastructure. Currently, 
infrastructure in Africa is lagging behind other emerging regions (see Table 2.2) 
 Beginning in the 1980s several governments in the region engaged in domestic trade 
reforms in an effort to increase their participation in international trade. The impetus for 
these reforms came from four sources. First, African countries that sought financial 
assistance from the IMF/World Bank undertook some domestic trade reforms as part of the 
requirements of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Second, there were also 
trade reforms undertaken by African countries as a result of bilateral trade and cooperation 
agreements. For example, in 1999 South Africa negotiated a free trade agreement with the 
European Union to increase access for its products to European markets and so had to 
adopt certain trade reforms. Third, African countries also engaged in some trade reforms 
arising from their membership of different regional economic groupings. The key regional 
economic groups in the region are: the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD). Finally, African countries have also undertaken 
reforms as a result of their increasing participation in the multilateral trading system. 
Membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) implies that African countries have 
to obey the WTO rules and also honour their commitments to the organisation. African 
countries that are not members of the WTO have also had to adopt trade reforms as part of 
the requirements for accession to the WTO. 
 How far did these reforms go? There is some consensus that the reforms undertaken 
by African countries in the 1980s and 1990s have made the region relatively more open to 
market forces and private sector activity. Exchange and price controls as well as marketing 
boards have been eliminated in several countries and there has been a significant reduction 
in tariffs (see Hinkle et al., 2003). In several countries, average trade weighted tariffs have 
been reduced to 15 per cent or less (World Bank, 2000). Also, core non-tariff barriers in 
the twelve SSA countries included in a recent study fell from 26 per cent in 1989-94 to 
10.4 per cent in 1995-98 (Martin, 2003). Despite the progress that has been made, the 
benefit to African countries from these reforms remains limited.  
 One might wonder why African countries are hesitant to fully liberalise their 
economies despite the conventional wisdom that free trade is good for growth and 
development? We see at least five reasons for this phenomenon. First, the evidence linking 
trade liberalisation to growth and development is not as clear as economists would like to 
believe. Two recent papers, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) and Rodrik (2001), have argued 
that there are fundamental and methodological problems with the series of studies 
suggesting that trade liberalisation enhances growth and development. They also pointed 
out that there is no convincing evidence that trade liberalisation is systematically 
associated with economic growth. The papers also suggest that the nature of domestic 
institutions plays a key role in determining whether or not liberalisation will have a 
positive outcome in an economy. Furthermore, even in countries in which liberalisation 
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was associated with growth, there is strong evidence that it was selective as opposed to 
comprehensive liberalisation that led to the observed outcome. 
 Second, several African countries rely on trade taxes for government revenue and so 
are concerned about the fiscal consequences of liberalisation for their economies. Between 
1999-2001, for instance, import duties represented about 34 per cent of government 
revenue in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa. In theory, trade liberalisation 
is unlikely to lead to any significant loss in trade tax revenue if it involves either the 
removal of quotas or reduction of very high tariffs and if the pre-liberalisation regime was 
characterised by import compression. When these conditions are absent, liberalisation is 
likely to have adverse consequences for trade tax revenue. That said, countries could adopt 
measures to ensure that liberalisation does not erode their revenue base. These include: 
attracting more aid flows; finding alternative sources of tax revenue; reforming domestic 
tax and customs administration; diversifying the economy; and reducing smuggling and 
corruption.  
 Third, in any case of liberalisation, there are bound to be winners and losers. If the 
losers have political clout they are likely to put pressure on domestic leaders to resist 
liberalisation, especially if there is no domestic mechanism in place to compensate them 
for the potential loss. 
 Fourth, there is a genuine concern among African countries that multilateral trade 
liberalisation and the associated rules and obligations would lead to the loss of domestic 
policy instruments and space needed to address pressing development problems. This is 
particularly important given that countries in the region are highly vulnerable to external 
shocks due largely to their high dependence on commodity exports (see chapter 3) 
 Finally, there is the widespread view that although African countries have made 
some progress in liberalizing their economies, they have not derived any significant 
benefits from the process. It is therefore understandable that they are reluctant to increase 
the pace of reforms. The key question then is how can African countries derive more 
benefits from domestic trade reforms?  
 African countries must learn, adapt, and incorporate the lessons of trade reforms in 
industrial, as well as other developing, countries into their trade reform programmes if they 
are to derive substantial benefits from the process. The key lessons from these experiences 
are that: 
- Trade policy must be integrated into national development strategies in order to 
avoid policy incoherence and allow countries to derive more benefits from trade; 
- For domestic trade reforms to enhance development, they must be carried out in such 
a way that they can have positive effects on sectors that generate employment and 
income; 
- The timing and pace of reforms must be chosen carefully to ensure the sustainability 
of policies and avoid the risk of policy reversals; 
- Trade reforms do not work in isolation. They have to be accompanied by other 
economic measures, such as a good macroeconomic policy environment and 
appropriate laws, infrastructure and institutions; 
- Diversification of an economy is necessary to minimise the impact of trade shocks on 
an economy and increase the benefits from trade reforms; and  
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- Trade reforms must not focus on imports alone. There is the need to promote exports 
if reform is to have any substantial positive impact on an economy. 
 
 
2.3 Africa and the Doha Development Agenda 
 
African countries are interested in increasing their involvement in the multilateral trading 
system so as to reap the benefits of global economic integration. However, they are 
disappointed that the region has not benefited from the huge gains resulting from an 
increase in world trade and finance in the last decade. This has led to an examination of the 
reasons why international trade has not played its expected role in enhancing growth and 
reducing poverty in the region? Two key factors are responsible for this phenomenon: 
(1) Lack of complementary domestic policies. For a country to take advantage of trade  
opportunities and reap the benefits of trade, it must put in place domestic policies 
that would create an incentive for the private sector to flourish. Unfortunately, up 
until the mid 1990s several African countries had domestic policies - for example, 
those affecting transport and transaction costs - that had negative effects on trade, 
investment, and growth in general. There was also the inability or unwillingness of 
African countries to put in place measures that would enable the region to lift supply 
constraints and to diversify so as to increase their ability to exploit the trading 
opportunities made available to the region. The fact that very few African countries 
have been able to take advantage of preferences received under the ACP-EU 
partnership agreements provides support for this idea. 
(2) Protective domestic agricultural policies and trading practices of OECD countries  
have also contributed to the inability of African countries to exploit the potential 
gains from multilateral trade liberalisation. In 2002 governments, consumers and 
taxpayers in OECD countries transferred over USD 234 billion to their agricultural 
producers.4 Support programmes encourage over-production and export dumping by 
producers in OECD countries. The support given to OECD producers allow them to 
sell their products on the world market at prices below production costs thereby 
depressing world prices and forcing competitors to struggle for survival or exit the 
market. Cotton presents a very interesting example of how OECD agricultural 
support programmes hurt African countries. Between 2001-2002, the US spent USD 
3.9 billion on agricultural support to its 25,000 cotton farmers, a figure that is twice 
the amount it spent in 1992. This agricultural support programme has had a negative 
impact on world cotton prices because the US is the largest exporter of the product. 
Since the mid 1990s, the price of cotton has fallen by about 54 per cent with 
devastating effects for cotton exporting countries in Africa. Available evidence 
suggests that US subsidies on cotton led to a loss of about USD 300 million in 
potential revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2001-2002. To put this figure into 
perspective, it is important to understand the extent of the damage caused to 
individual economies. For example, in Burkina Faso, it led to a loss of 1 per cent of 
                                                 
4 A preliminary measure for the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) in 2002 measured USD 234.8 million, 
against an average of USD 240.9 billion in the years 1986-1988 (OECD 2003). 
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GDP and 12 per cent of export revenue. In Mali, it led to a loss of 1.7 per cent of 
GDP and 8 per cent of export earnings. In Benin, the loss was about 1.4 per cent of 
GDP and 9 per cent of export earnings (Oxfam, 2002). The same story can be told of 
subsidies on other commodities exported by African countries but the experience of 
cotton provides a stark illustration of the adverse consequences of OECD agricultural 
support programmes in Africa. 
 
 In several rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, African countries expressed 
concerns about these external barriers inhibiting their ability to integrate into the global 
economy and take advantage of trading opportunities. An attempt to address this issue led 
to the declaration of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations as a Development 
Round. At the fourth WTO ministerial conference in Doha in November 2001, several 
promises were made to African countries, and developing countries in general, in an effort 
to increase their ability to benefit from global trade. However, in the twenty-one months 
between the Ministerial conferences in Doha and Cancun, no significant progress was 
made in the negotiations and this has led to the widespread feeling that it is highly unlikely 
that the promises made to poor countries under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) will 
be fulfilled before the December 2004 date set for the conclusion of the round. In the run-
up to the Cancun meeting, the US tried to inject new life into the talks by issuing a joint 
proposal with the European Union. While African countries had reservations about the 
nature and scope of the proposals, they saw it as a positive development and hoped that it 
would increase the prospects for a successful meeting in Cancun. As we all know, the 
Cancun Ministerial Conference ended with no agreement by Ministers on any of the key 
issues on the agenda.  
 From an African perspective, the failure of the talks in Cancun was not surprising 
given the fact that there was no serious effort made by the developed countries to address 
the key issues of concern to African countries in the negotiations. At Cancun African 
countries made demands in several areas of the negotiations (agriculture, cotton, non-
agricultural market access, and development issues) but the demands on cotton and 
agriculture attracted more attention at the meeting. On cotton, they made two requests: the 
first is the elimination of subsidies by developed countries within a reasonable and 
specified period; and the second was the payment of compensation to the affected-
countries during the transition period. On agriculture, they wanted more serious 
commitments from the developed countries to reduce and or phase out domestic support, 
export subsidies, and other barriers to agricultural trade. Clearly, developed countries were 
reluctant to make any serious concessions on these issues in Cancun. 
 The failure of the Cancun meeting has added more credence to the doubts expressed 
by African countries about the ability of the Doha round to meet their development 
aspirations. Africa's concerns in the on-going round of trade talks are in three parts. The 
first is the relatively low bargaining power of African countries in the negotiations as 
reflected in their inability to influence the agenda and pace of the negotiations. The second 
aspect of Africa's concerns relates to the fact that the areas in which there have not been 
significant progress in negotiations are those of importance to African countries: namely 
agriculture, non-agricultural market access; and development issues and concerns. The 
final aspect of Africa's concerns relate to the lack of an effective mechanism to address 
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problems of capacity constraints in the region. Existing trade capacity building 
programmes tend to have a short-term focus and do not provide a coherent framework to 
address problems posed by supply-side constraints and the lack of competitiveness of 
African economies. 
 Since the collapse of the Cancun meeting there have been informal discussions 
between some of the developed countries and African countries on what needs to be done 
to make the Doha round contribute to African development? An important fact that is 
emerging from these discussions as well as from research on African economies, is that 
progress in the negotiations on agriculture is important for the Doha round to make any 
real contribution to the development efforts of the region. In several African countries, a 
large proportion of the population depends on the agricultural sector for their livelihood. 
The sector accounts for roughly two-thirds of the region's labour force and one-third of its 
GDP. Consequently, an increase in agricultural productivity through trade is needed to 
increase the prospects for poverty reduction in the region. Other measures that could 
enhance the contribution of the round to African development include: 
- Better integration of development issues into the work programme of the WTO as 
well as mechanisms to make them fully effective and operational; 
- More flexibility in WTO agreements to enable African countries deal effectively 
with poverty reduction and food security issues; 
- Change of attitude by developed countries as evidenced by their willingness to 
honour commitments made to developing countries in previous rounds of trade 
negotiations; 
- More sensitivity to the implementation costs of WTO agreements for poor African 
countries; and 
- More meaningful and effective capacity building and technical assistance 
programmes. 
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3. Africa in World Trade 
 
 
 
3.1 Trade patterns 
 
Africa's trade potential has remained unfulfilled in the last 5 decades. While global trade 
volumes nearly doubled each decade, Africa's share in world trade gradually declined from 
over 7 per cent after World War II to just over 2 per cent in 2002 (see Figure 3.1 and 
Figure 3.2) (WTO, 2003).  
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Figure 3.1 African merchandise trade volume 1990-2002 (USD billion) 
 
 
 Clearly, an important way for African countries to increase their share of world trade 
is through an increase in intra-African trade. In 2002, intra-African trade represented only 
8 per cent of total African trade. When we consider manufactures and agricultural exports 
alone, however, the share of intra-African trade is about 15 per cent (USD 8.5 billion). 
History has shown that the largest share of world trade occurs within geographical regions 
that have reached a certain level of political and economic integration such as EU, NAFTA 
and ASEAN. There are several regional trading arrangements on the African continent 
(SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS, AMU, and COMESA etc) but they have not been very 
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successful in increasing trade among countries in the region. The reasons for this include: 
poor and inadequate infrastructure which limits the potential for cross-border movement of 
goods and persons; structural constraints associated with the fact that most countries in the 
region produce similar goods and so pay more attention to trade with countries outside the 
region; and the high incidence of conflicts in the region which breeds mistrust among 
members thereby creating an environment that is not supportive of integration. 
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Figure 3.2 African share in world merchandise trade, 1990-2002 (%) 
 
 
 This study attempts to estimate the economic benefits for Africa resulting from 
multilateral trade liberalisation. However, since the analysis is done at the sub-regional 
level, the results can only give a general indication of the impact of liberalisation on 
individual countries. For individual countries, an important factor is the net trade position 
in certain products. The reason is that trade reform affects world markets prices. More 
specifically, for many agricultural products trade liberalisation results in an increase in 
prices on world markets, which results in gains to exporters to the world and losses to 
importers from world markets. African countries are, at least in the short term, likely to be 
affected most by reforms in the field of agriculture and trade policy. This makes it useful to 
classify African countries according to their trade position in primary agriculture and 
processed agriculture products (Table 3.1). 
 Exports of agricultural products accounted for USD 22 billion in 2002, or 16 per cent 
of total African merchandise exports. Fuel exports account for half of total exports, or a 
flow of USD 67 billion. The remainder is accounted for by manufactures. In 2002, Africa's 
exports of clothing (USD 7.4 billion), machinery and transport equipment (USD 7 billion) 
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and iron and steel (USD 2.9 billion) expanded faster than world trade in these categories 
(WTO, 2003). 
 Sub-Sahara Africa accounts for approximately 40 per cent of total exports from 
Africa, and for over half of agricultural exports. Table 3.2 gives trade volumes and trade 
shares for the group of 45 countries in Sub-Sahara Africa. Nigeria and Angola are main 
exporters in the region, a reflection of large oil and diamond resources. Main agricultural 
exporters are Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Cameroon. A large set of countries 
records very small export levels.  
 
 
3.2 Revealed comparative advantage 
 
There is a range of export products from Sub-Sahara Africa that successfully participate in 
the world trading system. Identifying those products that perform well in international 
markets can give some indication as to which products and sectors might gain from a 
multilateral lowering of trade barriers. On the other hand, identifying products in which 
Africa does not have a comparative advantage will give an indication of sectors that may 
be adversely affected by increased competition due to a reduction in trade barriers. This is 
useful for the interpretation of the simulations, which are performed at a much higher level 
of aggregation. 
 One measure that helps to identify the competitive strength of a country is the so-
called 'Revealed Comparative Advantage Index' (RCA) (Balassa, 1965). Based on the 
index, if an export product from an African country has a large world market share - 
adjusted for the total participation of African exports in world trade - then the index 
exceeds the level 100, and the country is said to have a revealed comparative advantage in 
that product.5  
 The RCA index can be criticised on various grounds. For example, it does not take 
product differentiation and intra-industry trade into account. Another disadvantage of this 
indicator is that it only takes exports into consideration and does not account for import 
penetration. In the context of African trade, with few imports re-exported, this flaw can be 
overcome. The data analysed represent averages for the period 1993 to 2001 and use the 
full list of 261 products from the UNCTAD trade statistics. African exports are proxied by 
total imports of African products into the countries that report to UNCTAD, which gives 
about 90 per cent accuracy on the export data.  
 One advantage of the RCA index is that it ensures that export volume alone does not 
determine which products perform well on international markets. For instance, at 350 
million dollar, export volume of copper (SITC 682) is approximately equal to that of 
spices. Yet the index of copper stands at 135, while spices are at 1,422. This shows that the 
region Sub-Sahara Africa has a far greater share of world trade in spices than copper. The 
implication is that the export potential for spices is much larger than for copper.  
 Table 3.3 reports the 30 highest RCA indices calculated from all Sub-Sahara African 
exports at the SITC-3 level. The product list is, as expected, mostly made up of primary 
                                                 
5 The revealed comparative advantage for good i from Africa is defined as:  
[(export good i, Africa)/(world exports good i)]/ [total exports Africa)/ (world exports)] * 100 
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products, mining products and fuels. Traditional commodities cocoa, tea, and tobacco are 
at the top of the list. The eleventh rank for coffee on the 2001 RCA index confirms the 
depression in the coffee markets. Spice trade is clearly on the rise in the last decade. The 
indices for wood and cotton have declined somewhat from their peak in the later half of the 
1990s.  
 The two columns on the right reveal that a big score on the RCA index need not 
imply a large trade volume, although it often does. With a total of 45 billion dollar, these 
Top-30 products account for over 80 per cent of total exports in 2001. Crude petroleum 
oils is the product group with the largest volume by far in the list. Some products for which 
an African comparative advantage is often claimed do not appear in the list of table 2, 
groundnuts for example. Vegetables, the typical categories of 'non-traditional' export 
growth, rank around the 100 average. Ranked equally modest are leather and apparel 
products. These sectors, then, will likely contract under tougher international competition 
after trade reform. 
 This method allows a powerful demonstration of the effect of tariff escalation, i.e. 
the phenomenon of tariffs levied on products rising with the degree of processing required. 
Compare an index of over 5,000 for cocoa with a meagre 12 for chocolate, or a high of 394 
for sugars and molasses with a mere 31 for sugar confectionaries. A similar pattern shows 
in fruit trade, with fruit and nuts at 258, preserved fruit at 81, and fruit juices at 24. Clearly, 
there remains a traditional pattern in food trade of importing raw agricultural product from 
Africa, adding value through processing elsewhere. 
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Table 3.1 Country classification 
Trade position processed food Trade position primary products Trade position primary products 
 Net primary exporter  Net primary importer 
Net processed exporter Low Income countries: 
Ethiopia 
Togo 
Mauritania 
Mali 
Chad 
Uganda 
Sudan 
Madagascar 
Kenya  
Ghana 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cameroon 
Zimbabwe 
 
Middle Income Countries:  
Morocco 
RSA  
Equatorial Guinea 
Low Income countries: 
Senegal 
Mozambique 
Burkina Faso 
Benin 
 
Middle Income countries: 
Swaziland 
Mauritius 
Net processed importer Low Income countries: 
Somalia 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Rwanda 
Niger 
Malawi 
Guinea 
Congo Dem Rep 
Central African Republic 
Burundi 
Guinea-Bissau 
Comoros 
Tanzania 
Low income countries: 
Zambia 
Sierra Leone 
Nigeria =low inc? 
Liberia 
Gambia 
Congo Rep 
Angola 
Eritrea 
Lesotho 
 
Middle income countries: 
Egypt 
Botswana 
Tunisia 
Seychelles 
Libya 
Algeria 
Source: OECD (2001). 
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Table 3.2 Sub-Sahara Africa exports by country, 2001 
 
 
 Total Trade Trade Share Total Agriculture Trade Share 
 (USD mln) (%) (USD mln) (%) 
 
 
Nigeria 19,224 34 444 4 
Angola 6,317 11 45 0 
Côte d'Ivoire 3,258 6 2,684 22 
Gabon 3,009 5 479 4 
Cameroon 2,009 4 983 8 
Equatorial Guinea 1,787 3 119 1 
Sudan 1,728 3 272 2 
Zimbabwe 1,694 3 1,038 8 
Botswana 1,692 3 64 1 
Congo 1,672 3 112 1 
Kenya 1,638 3 1,123 9 
Mauritius 1,607 3 416 3 
Ghana 1,327 2 778 6 
Madagascar 1,112 2 552 4 
Liberia 1,088 2 187 2 
Guinea 870 2 58 0 
Mozambique 711 1 155 1 
Senegal 543 1 368 3 
Zambia 536 1 81 1 
Tanzania, UR 470 1 333 3 
Mauritania 464 1 224 2 
Congo, D.R. 434 1 32 0 
Malawi 429 1 383 3 
Ethiopia 312 1 227 2 
Uganda 304 1 289 2 
Seychelles 258 0 230 2 
Niger 249 0 23 0 
Togo 204 0 87 1 
Mali 189 0 104 1 
Burkina Faso 175 0 108 1 
Benin 128 0 106 1 
Other Sub-Sahara Africa a) 552 0 270 0 
Total 55,988 100 12,374 100 
 
 
a) This group consists of countries with trade shares lower than 1 per cent, both in total trade and agricultural 
trade. These countries are Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Central African Republic, Guinea, Chad, Comoros, 
Burundi, Somalia, Gambia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde. 
Source: ITC/WTO data. 
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Table 3.3 Revealed Comparative Advantage in Sub-Sahara Africa: Top 30 at SITC-3 level 
 
 
SITC code Product group RCA Export volume  
   (2001, USD mln) 
 
 
072  Cocoa 5247 2,430 
074  Tea and mate 2007 481 
121  Tobacco, unmanufactured 1597 987 
075  Spices 1422 327 
247  Wood rough,rough squared 1157 902 
263  Cotton 1127 698 
333  Petroleum oils, crude 995 29,865 
287  Ore,concentr.base metals 934 542 
285  Aluminium ore,conctr.etc 887 578 
071  Coffee,coffee substitute 848 731 
667  Pearls,precious stones 664 2,568 
231  Natural rubber, etc. 591 226 
793  Ship,boat,float.structrs 565 893 
037  Fish etc.prepd,prsvd.nes 537 493 
245  Fuel wood, wood charcoal 426 14 
272  Fertilisers, crude 423 54 
061  Sugars,molasses,honey 394 423 
265  Vegetable textile fibres 365 18 
036  Crustaceans,molluscs etc 364 625 
689  Misc.non ferro base metals 359 129 
223  Oilseed (oth.fix.veg.oil) 353 23 
284  Nickel ores,conctr,matte 341 71 
292  Crude veg.materials, nes 326 469 
248  Wood, simply worked 318 769 
342  Liquefied propane,butane 299 380 
344  Petroleum gases, nes 287 98 
057  Fruit,nuts excl.oil nuts 258 746 
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4. Trade Policy Landscape 
 
 
 
This chapter provides background information on selected issues in the current round of 
negotiations that are useful in understanding the results of the simulations. It provides an 
analysis of the three pillars in the negotiations on agriculture as well as the implications of 
differences between bound and applied tariffs. It also looks at the different approaches to 
trade liberalisation, examines the issue of trading costs and preferences, and presents an 
assessment of the degree of protection of OECD trade policies. The chapter concludes with 
an overview of the African position on the negotiations on agriculture in the WTO. 
 
 
4.1 Agriculture negotiations 
 
 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) set the stage for the 
negotiations on agriculture under the Doha Development Agenda. It was also the first time 
that disciplines on agricultural trade and production were set in the multilateral trading 
system. Despite this achievement, the URAA had several shortcomings among which is the 
fact that it could not deal effectively with the issue of tariff peaks and escalation. 
Furthermore, it imposed implementation costs on poor countries and negotiating parties 
gave themselves considerable leeway in the selection of the appropriate reference period 
from which to measure reductions in agricultural support. Negotiations under the DDA are 
expected to address these limitations of the URAA. 
 The Doha Declaration suggested guidelines for agricultural negotiations in this 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations. It specified that this Round should aim to obtain 
'substantial improvement of market access, reduction of all export subsidies, in view of 
their progressive withdrawal, and substantial reduction of domestic support having effects 
on trade distortion21'. These are the three 'pillars' in the agriculture negotiations under the 
Doha Development Agenda: market access concerns reductions in tariffs and tariff rate 
quotas; domestic support concerns commitments to reduce trade-distorting farm income 
policies; export competition concerns the promotion of agricultural exports through 
subsidies and export credits. 
 
4.1.1 Market access in agriculture 
 
One key difference between agricultural and industrial products is that essentially all 
agricultural tariffs are bound. However, in both industrial and developing countries, there 
is a large degree of binding overhang (See Table 4.1). Commitments not to erode current 
market access were meant to limit the scope for increased protection through 'dirty 
tariffication' or the use of 'ceiling bindings' (Hathaway and Ingco, 1996). As the name 
implies, dirty tariffication involved violations of the spirit, if not the letter, of the URAA 
text. It involved setting tariff bindings at rates far above the current effective protection 
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rates. The practice of setting high bindings complicated the problem of measuring the 
impact of further commitments to reduce bindings. Basically, in agriculture, we are in a 
world that allows scope for great policy discretion and uncertainty as a result of the loose 
nature of the commitments made. In addition, the setting of high bound rates made possible 
the conversion of non-tariff barriers (quotas and tariff rate quotas) into even more 
restrictive import tariffs. This in turn made quantity disciplines necessary to avoid 
backsliding.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Applied tariffs on agricultural imports in selected regions (% ad valorem) 
 
 
 Simple average Standard deviation Maximum tariff Binding overhang 
 
 
European Union 5.9 7.5 74.9 0.3 
Japan 6.2 8.1 43.3 1.2 
United States 3.5 7.4 90.0 0.5 
Brazil 12.9 5.1 27.0 22.6 
India 31.0 20.8 150.0 90.7 
Thailand 26.5 14.4 65.0 7.1 
 
 
Source: Francois and Martin (2003). 
 
 
4.1.2 Export subsidies & domestic support 
 
Under the Uruguay round negotiations, domestic support programmes were classified into 
three categories. The first category is the 'Amber Box,' which captures all domestic support 
measures that are considered to distort production or trade. Subsidies under this category 
are to be reduced or kept within defined limits. The second category, the Blue Box, covers 
payments aimed at limiting production. The final category, the Green Box, includes 
payments that do not distort trade or are considered to cause minimal distortion. Green box 
payments are allowed within limits. They include payments associated with environmental 
protection and those associated with regional development programmes.  
 The Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) is widely used to measure the extent of 
protection, particularly domestic support, in the agricultural sector. Although it is a price-
based measure, it includes only those forms of support that are agreed to be most trade 
distorting and so is not comprehensive.6 A major issue in the discussions on domestic 
support is how to reduce the scope and incentive for members to reallocate expenditures 
from categories that are considered trade distorting to those that are not considered trade 
distorting.7 This is of concern because although expenditures in the Amber Box are 
declining, there has been an increase in the use of Blue Box support.  
 As the AMS approach reflects available data, it is employed in this study as well. 
Table 4.2 provides data on the subsidies from farm-income policies and export competition 
for the EU, North America and high-income Asia. A negative number refers to a net tax on 
                                                 
6 See OECD (2003) for methodology and measurements.  
7 Tangermann (1998) provides a discussion on these issues.  
 31
producers in that sector. Note that the accuracy with which these data reflect current 
subsidies in these regions varies. These are 1997 data from the GTAP database, which 
have been updated for cotton only. The GTAP database does not include domestic 
protection measurement for cotton. We include average domestic support levels in the 
European Union and the United States in the late 1990s.8 Both export subsidies and 
domestic support vary largely from year to year due to variations in world prices, the size 
of harvests and other factors. So the numbers in the table provide an indication of support 
rather than a true reflection of the current state. They are used, nevertheless, as inputs in 
the simulation of policy changes in the model. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Agricultural subsidies in Quad countries (1997, USD million) 
 
 
 Domestic support Export subsidies 
   
 European North High income European North High income 
 Union America Asia Union America Asia 
 
 
1 Cereals 22,374 21,767 1,576 517 -7 -1 
2 Vegetable -1,074 -100 -350 25 -2 -3 
3 Oilseeds 6,029 2,606 -4 5 -5 -2 
4 Sugar 72 169 -8 865 0 0 
5 Cotton a) 1,276 1,392 0 0 0 0 
6 Other Crops -801 -5 -281 9 -1 -5 
7 Animal 14,650 4,240 1,200 0 -4 -2 
8 ProFOOD -17,455 -194 -49,463 2,939 118 -86 
 
 
a) Cotton support levels are updated with data from WTO notifications for European Union and United States 
only. See footnote 8. 
Source: GTAP database version 5. 
 
 
4.2 Analysis of Market Access Modalities 
 
There are various approaches to tariff reduction. Under the GATT negotiations on tariff 
reduction was initially based on a request-and-offer procedure. Under this approach 
members negotiate bilateral market access concessions, and subsequently extend them to 
other members. With a relatively small number of negotiating parties and the focus on a 
limited number of industrial products, members were able to substantially reduce average 
tariffs. However, the approach was abandoned in favour of a comprehensive formula 
approach in the Kennedy Round (1964-7). The next round, the Tokyo Round (1973-9) 
introduced the so-called Swiss formula. This approach was however abandoned during the 
Uruguay Round (1986-94) and a more flexible approach was adopted. This new approach 
required that, on average, tariffs were to be cut by a certain amount (e.g., 36% in 
                                                 
8 Reported data are domestic support commitments notified to the WTO secretariat for the two regions with 
the largest levels of support: US and EU. The levels of subsidies for cotton farmers are extremely volatile 
between years; here we use averages of 1999-2000 for US, of 1997-1998 for EU. 
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agriculture). The distribution of the cut across sectors was left for negotiations between 
trading partners. While achieving substantial tariff reductions, the Uruguay round allowed 
members to protect strategic sectors, and failed to achieve significant reductions in tariff 
escalation.  
 
How to assess the effects? 
To derive more benefits from trade negotiations, countries' have to assess the merits of the 
various proposals or modalities for market access, but it is not evident which criteria 
should be used for the assessment. For example, if an average cut in tariffs is the objective, 
it is not clear whether this should be a weighted or a simple average. If a weighted average 
is chosen and import weights are used, it may result in the underestimation of high 
prohibitive tariffs, because in such cases little trade occurs. There is also a complication 
introduced by the fact that bound rates for most countries are different from applied rates. 
This implies that reductions in bound rates do not always lead to reductions in applied rates 
and so it is important whether the reduction commitments are based on bound or applied 
rates. Other issues that arise in assessing the merits of different negotiating proposals 
include the effects of the proposals on: 
- Tariff peaks 
 As the most severe impediments to trade occur if very high tariffs are in place, the 
effects on peaks deserve separate attention; 
- Import prices 
 Ultimately, this is what affects domestic markets. Consumers will enjoy lower prices, 
while domestic producers might fear competitive pressure from cheaper imports. For 
a small importing country the direct effect on domestic prices equals the change in 
the power of the tariff T=t/(1+t), and can be readily calculated. For a large country, 
the effects on world markets need also to be taken into account; 
- Tariff revenues 
 This concerns especially those countries which use tariff revenues as a prime source 
for generating government revenues, and which have little alternative means to levy 
domestic taxes. Evaluation of tax revenue effects is not straightforward, as it requires 
taking into account direct tariff revenue effects as well as indirect spending effects 
and supply response by domestic industries; 
- Preferential market access 
 Tariff reduction erodes preferential trade conditions to the loss of currently preferred 
suppliers, and to the benefit of competing producers. 
 
Introducing formulae for agricultural market access 
The DDA negotiations on agriculture have introduced several approaches to tariff reform. 
The European Union prefers a Uruguay Round (UR) approach, which defines as the goal 
an average cut in tariffs. The Uruguay Round has in practice led to the outcome that larger 
cuts were applied to tariffs that were already relatively low, while applying only modest 
reductions to high tariffs. A minimum cut per tariff line, an additional requirement 
currently proposed, will prevent this, so the EU claims. In fact, this depends largely on the 
modalities for the minimum cut.  
 33
 The USA and the CAIRNS group have proposed a formula approach. In contrast to 
the UR approach, a formula approach sets out rules to cut tariffs on each tariff-line. 
Specifically, these countries would like to apply a Swiss formula approach because it 
achieves higher proportional cuts in higher tariff rates and results in a maximum ceiling 
tariff per tariff line. The Swiss formula is the most appropriate modality for addressing the 
issue of tariff escalation. The so-called Derbez text that emerged during the Cancun 
ministerial conference proposed a 'blended' formula that combines a UR and a Swiss 
formula approaches. To give readers an idea of the implications of the formula approaches 
discussed in the current round of negotiations, we provide illustrations with a proportional 
cut, a Swiss formula, and a blended formula. 
 
The proportional cut determines the new tariff t1 as a simple percentage of the original 
tariff t0: 
 
t1 = c t0  
 
For example, if a 30% reduction were desired, c would be 0.7. The Swiss formula 
determines the new tariff as: 
 
t1 = a t0/(a + t0) 
 
The parameter a is to be determined as part of the negotiations. It determines the maximum 
tariff that remains after the implementation of commitments. For example, if a = 25, then 
the maximum tariff will be 25%. Besides defining effectively ceiling tariff, the Swiss 
formula has the feature of yielding sharper reductions in high tariffs, as can be seen from a 
comparison with the Linear 36 approach in Figure 4.1 
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Figure 4.1 Linear 36 versus Swiss formula 
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 By contrast, the UR approach sets the average reduction as a negotiation parameter, 
while it leaves open the exact way in which such an average is to be achieved. In fact, the 
UR approach allows the setting of an individual per cent reduction ci for each tariff line. 
This becomes evident from the following equation, where we introduce a superscript i to 
distinguish tariff lines, where t0 and t1 are tariff rates before and after reform, and α denotes 
the simple average reduction: 
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 The following example is meant to illustrate the effects of different modalities. We 
show the effect of various modalities on a set of five initial tariffs that range from a high ad 
valorem tariff of 250% to a low one of just 10%. This reflects the variety of tariff lines for 
agricultural products in the world. 
 Figure 4.2 illustrates the effects of different modalities on the initial tariffs. Table 
4.3 shows the per cent cuts per tariff line. The linear proportional cut simply reduces each 
tariff by 36%, resulting in more favourable access conditions for the products subject to 
high tariffs, while the low tariff lines see relatively modest improvements. The UR 
approach shown in the figure assumes a minimum cut of 15% for each tariff line and an 
average reduction percentage of 36%. This is achieved in the example by reducing high 
tariffs by just 15% while reducing the Medium1 tariff by 25%, the Medium2 tariff by 36% 
and the Low tariff by as much as 90%. The incentive of this approach is clear: very modest 
reductions in the high tariff range and large reduction in the low range. This contrasts 
sharply with the Swiss formula approach, where we assume the parameter a to equal 25, as 
proposed by the USA ('Swiss 25'). This brings down sharply the high tariffs, and results in 
an average reduction percentage of 61%. See Table 4.4 for summary statistics on tariff 
dispersion, and Table 4.5 for the direct effects of the tariff reforms on domestic prices. 
 
 
Table 4.3 Per cent cuts per tariff line, % 
 
 
 Per cent cuts 
 Linear 36% UR 36% Swiss 25 Blended 
 
 
High1 -36 -15 -91 -18 
High2 -36 -15 -76 -40 
Medium1 -36 -25 -67 -50 
Medium2 -36 -36 -44 -44 
Low -36 -90 -29 -100 
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Table 4.4 Summary statistics, % 
 
 
 Linear 36% UR 36% Swiss 25 Blended Total 
 
 
Average 82 52 66 15 58 
Max 250 160 213 23 205 
Min 10 6 1 7 0 
Average cut -36 -36 -61 -50  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 Effects on domestic prices, % a) 
 
 
 Linear 36% UR 36% Swiss 25 Blended 
 
 
High1 -25.7 -10.7 -64.9 -12.9 
High2 -16.0 -6.7 -33.9 -17.8 
Medium1 -12.0 -8.3 -22.2 -16.7 
Medium2 -6.0 -6.0 -7.4 -7.4 
Low -3.3 -8.2 -2.6 -9.1 
 
 
a) Calculated as per cent change in the power of the tariff. 
 
 
 The blended formula approach proposed in the 'Derbez text' combines the UR 
approach with the Swiss formula and adds the requirement that at least one tariff line has to 
be reduced to zero. Given the features of the UR and the Swiss formula, we implement the 
blended formula by: applying the UR formula to the high and medium1 tariffs; reducing 
the low (nuisance) tariffs to zero; and applying the Swiss formula to the medium range. 
The UR component of the cocktail is constructed such that the average reduction within 
this component equals 36%. Such a behaviour can be expected to occur if countries want to 
avoid granting improved market access in products that are considered to be of 'strategic' 
value. Hence, blending allows members still a considerable leeway in designing their tariff 
landscape.  
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Figure 4.2 The impact of various modalities on tariffs 
 
 
 It is important to find the interest of the negotiating parties in specific modalities. 
The examples given can be roughly interpreted as follows. The EU proposal of a UR 
approach points to a strong interest in keeping market access restricted for program 
commodities as long as domestic support policies are in the process of reform. The EU, as 
well as Japan and Korea, have large tariff peaks in agriculture. It is in the interest of 
agricultural exporters to reduce these peaks. The use of a Swiss formula approach is in the 
interest of these countries because they have open markets in general (Australia and New 
Zealand) or have tariff peaks in non-agricultural sectors (US and Canada). 
 
 
4.3 Non-agricultural market access 
 
Tariff negotiations in the GATT/WTO have generally been based on tariff bindings, or 
schedules of concessions tabled under GATT rules, and the coverage and level of these 
bindings are important elements of the negotiations. While tariffs in the OECD (and Latin 
America) are generally bound, many Asian and African economy tariffs remain unbound 
despite more than a four-fold increase in the coverage of developing-country tariff 
bindings in the Uruguay Round (Abreu, 1996). For almost all developing countries, 
existing bindings are, on average, well above applied rates, reflecting a combination of 
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relatively high initial bindings, and the subsequent wave of reductions in applied rates. 
(See Blackhurst et al., 1996; Francois, 2001).  
 In addition to the general Uruguay Round commitments, there have also been efforts 
for sector-based commitments to implement zero tariffs (called 'zero-for-zero'). As a result 
of zero-for-zero efforts, OECD economies have between roughly 10% and 30% of tariff 
lines bound at zero per cent. Most developing countries have opted out of this process. 
Zero-for-zero increased developed country duty-free imports to 43% of total imports 
(Laird 1998). The process itself ground to a halt after the initial Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA). This seems to have been for two reasons: (i) the sectors in which OECD 
economies could easily reach agreement had already been included, and (ii) those sectors 
remaining involve North-South issues not susceptible to this approach.  
 With the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, average ad valorem 
tariffs in the industrial countries generally are around 3 per cent, as is reflected in Table 
4.6. However, there are important exceptions. One of these is textiles and clothing, where 
the average rate is roughly three times this average. This is reflected in the standard 
deviation and maximum tariff columns. With full implementation of current commitments, 
we estimate a simple average industrial tariff in the United States of 3.2 per cent, a 
standard deviation of 4.3, and a maximum tariff of 37.5 per cent. The European Union has 
a higher average, but less dispersion: the EU has an average of 3.7 per cent, a standard 
deviation of 3.6 per cent, and a maximum tariff of 17 per cent.  
 Table 4.6 also presents detailed data for three developing countries: Brazil, India, and 
Thailand. These countries span the spectrum of bindings in developing countries. Brazil's 
tariffs are all bound, though the average rate for industrial products is 14.9 percentage 
points above the current applied rate. This gap is called a 'binding overhang'. India and 
Thailand's tariffs are partially covered by bindings, again with significant binding 
overhang. For many developing countries the situation of Brazil applies: substantial 
binding means that reductions on bound rates in the range of 50% are necessary to force 
reductions in average applied rates. For many countries, even this will have little or no 
effect, as tariffs are largely unbound. For example, note that one-third of India's 
manufacturing tariffs and 84 per cent of Zimbabwe's tariffs are unbound (Francois, 2001). 
Of course, this limits severely the negotiating leverage of developing countries in the 
WTO. This is also why the debate of using bound, applied, or 'historic' rates as a starting 
point is important. 
 For services, 'market access' is a problematic concept. From the outset, service 
negotiations have been 'qualitative.' They have not targeted numeric measures, but rather 
commitments in the cross-border movement of consumers and providers and the 
establishment of foreign providers. In fact, the GATS actually confuses FDI with 
international trade. As a result, efforts to quantify market access in service sectors (a basic 
requirement if we want to then quantify liberalisation) have been problematic at best. The 
standard approach (as exemplified by Hoekman, 1995) has been to produce inventory 
measures. 
 Our modelling exercise will exclude a simulation of liberalised services trade. It is 
difficult to find reliable data on traded services, and more so for Africa. For an exploratory 
study on the impact of reforms in services trade, the reader is referred to Francois et al. 
(2003b). 
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Table 4.6 Applied non-agricultural tariffs on imports in selected regions (% ad valorem) 
 
 
 Post-UR and ITA tariffs 
  
 Simple average Standard deviation Maximum tariff Binding overhang 
 
 
European Union 3.7 3.6 17.0 0.4 
Japan 2.3 3.4 30.9 0.1 
United States 3.2 4.3 37.5 0.2 
Brazil 15.9 6.0 35.0 14.9 
India 19.2 16.5 40.0 3.9 
Thailand 10.5 10.8 80.0 7.8 
 
 
Source: Francois and Martin (2003). 
 
 
4.4 Trade Preferences 
 
Most African imports into OECD countries are traded under preferential conditions. The 
European Union, Japan, the United States and several developed countries reduce import 
duties and/or quantity restrictions on imports from Africa. Trade preferences follow a 
common format. First, all countries classified as developing countries are eligible for 
preferential trade under a Generalised System of Preferences. Second, a set of 'deeper' and 
'wider' preferences for the least developed countries (LDCs) complements the GSP 
scheme. For example, the EU grants (with some major exceptions) all products from LDCs 
unrestricted market access at zero-duty under the 'Everything But Arms' initiative. The US 
has a similar but less comprehensive scheme for African LDCs under the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act. Third, a myriad of bilateral deals or trade integration arrangements 
with favoured trade partners adds (or reduces) the depth of preferences. In this category we 
find the EU scheme for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries under the Cotonou 
Agreement, and various trade deals with North African countries. Most large importers 
have trade arrangements with important African economies such as Egypt and South 
Africa. 
 The value of a trade preference is the preference margin, i.e. the per cent reduction 
on the Most Favoured Nation tariff applied on imports from the beneficiary country. 
Generally, the preference margins are substantial for LDCs but rather moderate under GSP 
schemes. GSP generally is of little effect on large import duties: large tariffs occur mostly 
on sensitive agricultural products, for which preference margins are low or nonexistent. 
Table 4.7 reports on preferences margins as these have been calculated for this study. 
Appendix A documents the data and methods applied. For exporters, the application of a 
preferential tariff rate generally implies a certain transaction cost, often in the form of an 
administrative procedure or the need to present certified information regarding the make of 
the product (UNCTAD, 2001). Exporters balance these costs against the preference 
margin, and may find that the benefits do not outweigh the costs. When preferences are in 
fact not utilised, the data presented here exaggerate the potential benefits of preferential 
trade.  
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Table 4.7 Preference margins for Africa (% cut on MFN tariffs) a) 
 
 
 EU-25 US/Canada High-income Asia 
    
 nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica 
 
 
Cereals 0 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vegetable 14 69 65 16 46 16 5 6 5 
Oilseeds 0 16 16 30 30 30 0 0 0 
Sugar  3 23 21 0 0 0 5 5 5 
Cotton 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Other Crops 14 63 63 2 6 2 18 34 18 
Animal 0 33 30 2 3 2 0 0 0 
proFood 19 59 57 13 32 13 7 12 7 
Extract 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Light 23 100 100 2 3 2 44 56 44 
Industry 41 84 77 47 61 47 100 100 100 
Trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
a) Under 0% preference margin, the full MFN tariff applies, under 100% margin the applied duty is nil.  
Data sources: applied tariffs from the GTAP database v5.3; average preference margins based on Hoekman et 
al. (2001). 
 
 
 To beneficiaries, an important feature in trade negotiations is that preference margins 
erode in the process of a global reduction of MFN tariffs. However, a modest tariff cut on 
tariff lines with a large binding overhang (much 'water in the tariff') has little effect on 
applied tariffs, and does not reduce pre-reform preference margins for African producers 
vis-à-vis their competitors in other (developing) regions. An important implication is that 
one should analyse preferences and binding overhang in close connection to one another.  
 How does this relate to market access for African exports? In Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.5 
we present the level and the composition of bound tariffs that the African exporters face in 
the importing countries. They are aggregated over all importing OECD countries, and non-
OECD countries (including the African countries). Trade flows are used as aggregation 
weights, and therefore this presents a view on world market access from the perspective of 
African trade. Bound rates are taken from the GTAP database. Water and preference 
margins are computed as explained in Appendix A.  
 Regarding the levels of bound tariffs on exports of the African region, what is 
striking is that substantial tariff barriers remain from the Uruguay Round. As in most 
sectors tariffs above 10 per cent ad valorem are common, market access reforms can be 
expected to have substantial impact on export prices in the global trading system. Bound 
rates in manufactures (light and heavy industry) are generally higher in non-OECD 
markets than in OECD regions. In various agricultural sectors, non-OECD markets show 
better access than OECD markets.  
 In terms of their composition, bound rates can be cut into three ad valorem pieces: 
the binding overhang or water gives the wedge between UR committed bound rate and the 
applied MFN (most favoured nation) rate; the preference margin reflects the reduction on 
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MFN rates to the beneficiaries of trade preferences, providing them with a competitive 
edge. Preference margins generally range between 5 and 10 per cent ad valorem. They 
apply mostly to African exports of vegetables, sugar, and processed food in agriculture, 
and to manufactures. Sub-Sahara Africa benefits in almost all sectors, due to zero-duty 
access of its LDCs. If there are no preferences granted, as in most non-OECD countries, 
the MFN rate is the applicable rate to exporters. North Africa faces large applied tariffs for 
its exports of cereals, sugar and processed food. For the other two regions sugar has the 
highest applied tariff. 
 The diagrams confirm that non-OECD tariffs contain much more water than OECD 
rates. Water of 20 to 40 per cent ad valorem is common. Any partial tariff reform first 
squeezes this water out before applied rates are lowered, which is why partial reforms of 
border measures have but modest impact on market access in developing countries. 
However, any cut in tariff directly erodes trade preferences to African exporters. In 
addition, as will be explained in a later chapter, reforms drive up prices for many imported 
agricultural products. As a result, African consumers of imported goods and producers of 
export goods are vulnerable to a partial liberalisation under the WTO. 
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Figure 4.3 Level and composition of the bound tariffs for exports of North Africa (% ad valorem) 
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Figure 4.4 Level and composition of the bound tariffs for exports of sub-Saharan Africa (% ad valorem) 
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Figure 4.5 Level and composition of the bound tariffs for exports of Southern Africa (% ad valorem) 
 
 
4.5 Assessing the Degree of Protection of OECD Trade Policies 
 
Before examining the impact of OECD trade policies on African economies, it is useful to 
assess the degree of protection of OECD trade and agricultural policies. Relatively few 
studies have attempted to quantify the degree of protection associated with agricultural 
support policies in OECD countries using well-designed and rigorous econometric criteria. 
Two recent studies have tried to address this issue, although with contradictory results.  
 Bouet et al. (2001), examined the extent of trade barriers existing in developed 
countries using Market Access Maps (MAcMaps), which is a bilateral and disaggregated 
measure of market access that integrates various instruments of protection and takes 
account of the fact that developed countries' apply different rates of protection on products 
imported from their trading partners through preferential trade arrangements. The 
instruments of protection considered in the study are: ad valorem duties, specific duties, 
tariff quotas, anti-dumping duties, and sanitary, environmental and technical norms. The 
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study found that of the developed countries considered, the aggregate degree of trade 
protection in Switzerland was the highest with a MAcMaps tariff mean of 15.1 per cent 
(See Table 4.8). The United States ranked second with a tariff mean of 11.8 per cent, 
followed by the European Union (9.7 per cent), Japan (9.0 per cent), and Australia (8.8 per 
cent). An interesting point to note in the results is that the United States appears to be more 
protective than the European Union even though the data show that tariff quotas, 
prohibitions, and ad valorem and specific duties are more protective in the later (see Table 
4.9). The authors argue that this has to do with the fact that the European Union has a 
greater incidence of discriminatory regimes and preferential trade agreements that give 
some developing countries more access to its markets. 
 
 
Table 4.8 Ranking of Countries by Degree of Protection 
 
 
Country Tariff MacMaps (%) Ranking of Countries 
 
 
Australia 8.80 1 
Japan 9.00 2 
Morocco 19.40 8 
EU 9.70 3 
USA 11.80 4 
Brazil 13.40 5 
Switzerland 15.10 6 
China 18.40 7 
 
 
Source: Bouet et al. (2001). 
 
 
Table 4.9 Protection Measures by Type of Instruments 
 
 
 Canada USA Japan European Union 
 
 
Average Ad valorem taxes (%) 7.10 4.87 6.55 5.88 
Specific Duties (%) 
(Average ad-valorem equivalent) 7.97 12.75 7.37 50.04 
No. of Prohibitions 0 0 0 881 
Average In-Quota Tariff  
Rate (%) 3.50 8.70 17.28 15.17 
Average Out-Quota Tariff  
Rate (%) 169.12 41.83 234.83 60.19 
 
 
Source: Bouet et al. (2001). 
 
 
4.6 The African Agenda for Agricultural Trade Policy 
 
The negotiations on agriculture are of great importance to African countries because of the 
critical role of the agricultural sector in the region. Agriculture is a major source of 
employment in the region and accounts for about 70 per cent of total employment. It also 
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plays a key role in economic growth, accounting for roughly 24 per cent of the regions 
GDP and 40 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings (Economic Commission for Africa, 
2002). In addition, developments in the agricultural sector significantly affect the 
economic performance of the region with potential consequences for poverty reduction 
efforts.  
 The position of African countries within the framework of international negotiations 
on agricultural concerns evolves around two principles. On one side, it calls for greater 
access to developed-country markets for their agricultural products and the elimination of 
the most devastating forms of market support. At the same time, all these countries are 
calling for greater flexibility in the liberalisation process by maintaining some form of 
protection for their farmers to ensure food security. These protections have become, all the 
more necessary given the increase in food insecurity and growing poverty in the 
countryside. See Economic Commission for Africa (2004) for a historical discussion on 
African interests in the multilateral negotiations on agricultural trade. The demand of 
African countries now revolve around four main concerns: 
 
4.6.1 Market Access 
 
At this level, African countries are demanding for greater openness of markets for their 
product through the reduction of tariff-peaks. Most particularly, they are demanding for the 
reduction of tariff-peaks and the abandonment of the tariff escalation applied against their 
agricultural and processed products.  
 
4.6.2 Domestic support to production 
 
At this level, the African countries are demanding the elimination of subsidies in the blue 
box. Regarding support in the amber box, these should be progressively phased-out and 
eliminated around year 2015. Finally, in relation to assistance in the green box, African 
countries, while taking into account developed country concerns for the protection of the 
environment and maintenance of the rural landscape, are demanding more rigorous criteria 
for defining support measures which should enter this category. This rigour is necessary in 
order to avoid the situation whereby contested blue and amber box support items become 
progressively integrated into this category. 
 
4.6.3 Export Subsidies  
 
The African countries declared in favour of the elimination of these subsidies between now 
and year 2010. 
 
4.6.4 Specific treatment for development 
 
African countries demanded a less stiff reduction of custom duties on agricultural products, 
longer period for the implementation as well as complete exemption for the LDCs.  
 Furthermore, some African countries underscored the strategic character of 
agricultural policies in development, which made food security a fundamental imperative 
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within the fundamental rights of people. To this end, they suggested the establishment of a 
special support category for development in the agricultural sector.  
 This chapter gave an idea on the views of African countries on international 
negotiations. Therefore, the objective of this study is to inform better their positions on 
their main areas of concern 
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5. Model, Data and Scenarios  
 
 
 
5.1 Model structure  
 
The framework adopted in this study is the GTAP model, which is a comparative static, 
multi-sector, and multi-region general equilibrium model. Each country or region is 
depicted within the same structural model. The regional household to which the income of 
factors, tariff revenues and taxes are assigned represents the consumer side. It is assumed 
that the regional household allocates its income to three expenditure categories: private 
household expenditures, government expenditures and savings. Consumption of private 
household is depicted using a non-homothetic Constant Difference of Elasticities (CDE) 
function.  
 A representative producer for each sector of a country or region makes production 
decisions to maximise profits by choosing inputs of labour, capital, and intermediates to 
produce a single sector output. Producers can substitute primary factors for each other, and 
this substitution possibility is captured using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
functional form. In addition, it is assumed that intermediate goods are used in fixed 
proportions (Leontief). In the case of crop production, farmers also make decisions on land 
allocation. Intermediate inputs are produced domestically or imported, while primary 
factors cannot move across country. Internationally traded commodities are assumed to be 
distinguished according to the region of origin. Using this so-called Armington assumption 
implies that for example wheat imported from the US is different from wheat imported 
from the EU, and trade flows in both varieties have their own price tag. A great advantage 
of the Armington assumption is that it allows us to model bilateral trade flows and bilateral 
trade policies. We exploit this feature in the treatment of trade preferences vis-à-vis 
developing countries.  
 The GTAP model includes two global institutions. All transports between regions are 
carried out by the international transport sector. The trading costs reflect the transaction 
costs involved in international trade, as well as the physical activity of transportation itself. 
Using transport inputs from all regions the international transport sector minimises its costs 
under the Cobb-Douglas technology. The second global institution is the global bank, 
which takes the savings from all regions and purchases investment goods in all regions 
depending on the expected rates of return. The global bank guarantees that global savings 
are equal to global investments.  
 The welfare changes are measured by the equivalent variation. Taxes are included in 
the theory of the model at several levels. Production taxes are placed on intermediate or 
primary inputs, or on output. Some trade taxes are modelled at the border. Additional 
internal taxes can be placed on domestic or imported intermediate inputs, and may be 
applied at differential rates that discriminate against imports. Trade policy instruments are 
represented as import or export taxes/subsidies. A detailed discussion of the basic algebraic 
model structure of the GTAP model can be found in Hertel (1997). 
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 A salient feature of many developing countries is unemployment (or under- 
employment) of human resources. This is at variance with the usual general equilibrium 
treatment of full employment of factors of production. We therefore modify the model to 
allow for unemployment of unskilled labour in African economies. This is achieved by 
fixing the nominal wage rate, and letting the volume of employment of unskilled labour 
adjust (see McDonald and Walmsley (2003)). This specification of the labour market still 
allows the real wage to adjust.  
 
 
5.2 Aggregation 
 
We employ the version 5.3 of the GTAP database, which refers to the year 1997 
(Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002). For the analysis we aggregate the GTAP database into 
12 regions (Table 5.1) and 13 sectors (Table 5.2). All African countries are split into three 
regions: North Africa (nAfrica), Southern Africa (sAfrica), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
The region North Africa includes all countries with access to the Mediterranean Sea. South 
Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland constitute the region Southern Africa while the 
region Sub-Saharan Africa comprises all remaining African countries. The aggregation of 
sectors has been designed to provide some degree of detail in the coverage of agriculture 
and food sectors, which are of central interest to this study. Five sectors cover the rest of 
the economy. More details about the aggregation can be found in Appendix B. 
 The study uses a fairly global division for the sectors and a quantitative approach to 
agricultural policy in both the EU and third countries. Naturally, each sector in each 
country has its own specific characteristics, which cannot be examined individually in such 
a global analysis. The results presented in the study should therefore primarily be seen as 
an indication of the scale and direction of the anticipated effects. 
 
 
Table 5.1 Regions 
 
 
Name Region 
 
 
nAfrica North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 
sAfrica Southern Africa (South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) 
EU15 European Union (15 Member countries) 
NAM North America (United States and Canada) 
SAM South America 
AUSNZ Australia and New Zealand 
HiASIA High-income Asia (Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan) 
China China and Hong Kong 
OASIA Other Asian Countries 
CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries (EU Accession in 2004) a) 
ROW Rest of the World 
 
 
a) Also referred to as Transition countries. 
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Table 5.2 Sectors 
 
 
Name Sector 
 
 
Cereals Wheat, Paddy Rice, other Cereals 
Vegetable Vegetables (also Potato) and Fruit 
Oilseeds Oil Seeds and oil processing 
Sugar  Sugar Beet, Sugar Cane and Sugar Processing 
Cotton Fibre plants 
Other Crops Beverages and Spice Crops, Tobacco, Flowers 
Animal Cattle, Sheep, Pork, Poultry, Eggs, Raw Milk 
ProFood Processed Food including Meat and Dairy 
Extract Extraction Industries 
Light Textile and Wearing apparel Industries 
Industry Other Industries a) 
Trade Trade and Transport Services 
Other Services Energy Supply, Financial Services, Education 
 
 
a) Also referred to as heavy industries. 
 
 
5.3 Data Preparation and Simulation 
 
In 2005 when the outcomes of the Doha round are expected to be implemented, the trade 
policy environment will have changed considerably. For this reason a baseline is 
constructed that includes several changes in the medium term. Then, trade reform of 
varying degrees of comprehensiveness are simulated, and welfare effects in African sub-
regions are measured as deviations from the baseline. 
 In order to get the baseline run that serves as a starting point for our analysis, some 
important policy changes between 1997 - the reference year of the database - and 2005 are 
simulated: all Uruguay Round commitments; the reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy of the EU under Agenda 2000 (van Meijl and van Tongeren, 2002); China's WTO 
accession;9 the implementation of the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) that 
phases out all quota restrictions in textile trade from 2005 onwards; and the EU Eastwards 
Enlargement, simulated as a total trade liberalisation between the 15 EU member countries 
and the region CEEC and the adoption of EU border tariffs in CEEC countries.  
 Having simulated a range of policy measures between 1997 and 2005, we produce a 
baseline suitable for an analysis of the impact of the Doha Round. If the negotiations can 
be concluded according to schedule, commitments made under the Doha Round are to be 
implemented from 2005 onwards. 
 
 
                                                 
9 The integration of China in the WTO is incorporated by equalising all import tariffs according to the Most 
Favoured Nation clause. 
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5.4 Trading costs 
 
With the reduction in traditional trade barriers, attention in the regional and multilateral 
trade arenas has not only shifted to quantity restrictions, but also to trade facilitation 
measures. These are meant to target less transparent trade barriers, such as customs 
procedures, product standards and conformance certifications, licensing requirements, and 
related administrative sources of trading costs. Studies of regional integration initiatives 
(Baldwin and Francois, 1997; Smith and Venables, 1988) have emphasised the potential 
for liberalisation initiatives to substantially reduce such barriers. Conceptually, these costs 
are different from the price and quantity measures used for manufactures and agriculture. 
They are a pure global deadweight loss. The estimates of trading costs are very rough (at 
best). Nonetheless, they provide some sense of the magnitudes involved. An overview of 
estimates is provided in Table 5.3. In the context of the EC single market program, 
elimination of internal customs procedures and related administrative streamlining were 
projected to reduce trading costs by up to 2 per cent of the value of trade (EC 1988). 
Globally, UNCTAD (1994) has noted that trading costs represent 7 to 10 per cent of the 
cost of delivered goods. Like the EC, UNCTAD also estimates that simple trade 
facilitation measures could reduce these costs by 2 per cent of the value of trade. The 
Australian Industry Commission (1995) has estimated potentially higher savings in the 
context of APEC, ranging from 5 to 10 per cent of the value of trade. Under more modest 
facilitation initiatives, the Japanese Economic Planning Agency (1997) has estimated 
savings at 2 per cent in an APEC context, while Francois (2001) has employed a similar 
range of estimates. 
 
 
Table 5.3 Estimated cost savings from trade facilitation 
 
 
European Commission (1992) In the context of the Single Market program, savings may amount to  
 1.6 per cent to 1.7 per cent of the value of trade due to savings on  
 administrative costs. 
UNCTAD (1994) Costs of transactions represent 7 to 10% of the value of trade. Trade  
 facilitation could reduce this to 5% to 8%. 
Australian Industry Trade facilitation may save 5% to 10% of the total value of trade,  
Commission (1995) through reduced transaction costs, in the APEC context. 
Japan EPA (1997) A 'modest' APEC initiative may lead to 2% savings (as a share of the  
 value of trade) due to reduced transaction costs. 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Policy scenarios 
 
The core of our analysis is structured around a set of scenarios. These scenarios are based 
on alternative liberalisation approaches for trade in agriculture and manufactured goods. 
They are meant to illustrate the implications of alternative approaches to market access 
liberalisation. They are stylised rather than exact representations. In part, this is because we 
are working with an aggregate model (i.e. we do not model trade at the 6-digit HS level), 
and as such detailed treatment of all product-specific proposals is simply impossible. In 
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addition, the actual market access modalities remain to be worked out. In agriculture, 
domestic support may or may not be affected, developing countries may or may not have 
to liberalise, and certain politically sensitive sectors may yet again escape meaningful 
liberalisation. Our scenarios are themselves decomposed into different components, related 
to specific sets of countries and specific sectors and instruments. This offers the advantage 
of allowing us (or the reader) to construct rough representations of hybrid liberalisation 
experiments later, since individual components can be taken from different scenarios and 
combined.10 
 In view of the proposals that have been made in the ongoing WTO Doha Round, we 
define and perform experiments for three scenarios of trade reform, namely, little, modest, 
and full liberalisation. The first two scenarios are partial liberalisation scenarios. The 'little' 
liberalisation scenario involves a linear 36% cut in agricultural tariffs; a 20% cut in 
industrial tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support for agriculture, and a partial 
reduction in trading costs, related to trade facilitation measures. The 'modest' liberalisation 
scenario involves a 50% reduction in all trade instruments. The third and most 
comprehensive scenario, involves full elimination of all border and support measures. 
Table 5.4 summarises the policy experiments. 
 
 
Table 5.4 Liberalisation scenarios  
 
Scenario Policy Changes  
 
Little Tariff Reduction: Agricultural Goods 36%, all other Goods 20% 
 Reduction of Export Subsidies 20% 
 Reduction Domestic Support 20% 
 Trade Facilitation 1% 
Modest Tariff Reduction: All Goods 50% 
  Reduction of Export Subsidies 50% 
  Reduction Domestic Support 50% 
 Trade Facilitation 1,5% 
Full Tariff Reduction: All Goods 100% 
 Reduction of Export Subsidies 100% 
 Reduction Domestic Support 100% 
 Trade Facilitation 3%  
 
                                                 
10 Technically, decomposition of general equilibrium-related effects of policy scenarios exhibit path 
dependence, meaning that the decomposition can be sensitive to the ordering of the elements of the 
experiment set. The impact of a particular instrument is also sensitive to the other members of the set.  We 
employ a linear decomposition method here that does not exhibit path dependence (Harrison et al., 2000). As 
such, individual experiment elements are roughly additive.  
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6. Results 
 
 
 
This chapter presents results of the static model showing precisely how various degrees of 
trade liberalisation could impact on African economies. We provide results at the sub-
regional level for North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Africa. We focus on the 
sub-regional level because most African countries are not in the GTAP database and so it 
is not possible to conduct the analysis at the country level. However, to the extent that 
groups of countries have similar structures general inferences can be drawn on how the 
reforms might affect individual countries.  
 
 
6.1 Aggregate results 
 
Our simulations show that a very complete liberalisation of distortions in both agricultural 
and non-agricultural trade could bring modest benefits to the African continent, as it does 
for all regions in the world.11 The results suggest that full reform would add 0.3 per cent to 
global income annually. Furthermore, they suggest that the gain to the African region is 
about 0.7 per cent of GDP. Although the absolute gains to the African region seem small, 
they are quite significant for two reasons. The first is that Africa reaps above average 
welfare gains (Figure 6.1). Its share of the global welfare gain is 5 per cent while its share 
in global GDP and trade is about 2 per cent. The second is that these benefits are expected 
to reoccur each year and so the long-term benefits of liberalisation to the region are likely 
to be substantial. 
 Appendix Table 1 (page 87) gives more detail on the welfare effects under various 
scenarios of trade reform. It shows that in all regions of the world the gains from reform 
are largest under a comprehensive reform. In fact, benefits grow with the depth of reforms. 
In Africa, reform results in yearly welfare gains of USD 3.7 billion under full 
liberalisation, of USD 216 million under modest reform, and in a loss of USD 605 million 
under little reform. The gains are unevenly distributed among the African sub-regions. 
National income gains in Southern Africa and North Africa amount to 0.9 per cent of GDP 
under full reform, about 3 times as much as the gains for sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, 
sub-Saharan Africa is vulnerable to little or modest reform, as it incurs losses.  
 
 
                                                 
11 We measure income gains as Equivalent Variation (EV). This is a single summary statistic to ascertain the 
net benefits from a policy change. The EV tells us how much money should be given or taken away from a 
consumer to compensate him for a change in the consumption pattern arising from a change in prices.  
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Figure 6.1 Additional national income after trade reform, derived from equivalent variation  
  (per cent change) 
 
 
 The result that sub-Saharan Africa is vulnerable to 'little' and 'modest' reforms can be 
attributed to the effect of preference erosion. The sub-region is a major beneficiary of 
preferences and partial market access reforms reduce tariffs on products exported to 
preference granting countries from countries that are not part of the preferential trading 
arrangements, thereby eroding any given preferential market access benefits received by 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The effect of preference erosion is magnified by the 
existence of 'binding overhangs', that is the phenomenon of bound tariff rates being 
significantly higher than applied rates in several countries. Under 'little' and 'modest 
reforms', which involve 20 to 50 per cent tariff cuts, there is strong preference erosion in 
sub-Saharan Africa and the sub-region faces more competition with exporters from 
developing countries in other regions. But because of binding overhangs, partial reforms of 
the magnitude considered do not result in a reduction in applied tariffs in several countries. 
Consequently, there are no improvements in market access for African products in other 
regions. In contrast, however, under a comprehensive reform, African producers suffer 
from preference erosion but they also have more access to markets in other regions and so 
experience positive welfare gains. This accounts for the difference in the results between 
partial and full reforms. 
 What drives welfare changes after trade reform? Welfare is to be increased by 
making better use of available resources. Trade reform cuts barriers between economies, 
and thereby typically expands the range of choices for factors of production to be used, and 
increases consumer choice. The removal of subsidies and taxes has a similar impact. Better 
allocation results in more production and consumption, even with an unchanged amount of 
means. Expanded trade opportunities are instrumental in achieving such gains: typically, 
import goods can be obtained cheaper, and increased specialisation in a competitive 
production scheme allows more exports to the world market that can finance the imports. 
Table 6.1, which decomposes the global total welfare impact from full liberalisation into 
its main components, shows that the reshuffling of resources accounts for 3/4th of global 
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welfare gains, or about USD 70 billion. For the African region, a large share of the gains to 
the region can be attributed to an improvement in the allocation of resources.  
 The remainder of the global gains comes from the increased availability of resources 
in the global economy. The first of two resource increases in the simulation refers to an 
employment effect in Africa. The expansion of the African economies allows previously 
unemployed or underemployed unskilled labour resources to be better utilised in the wage 
economy. Tapping this reserve leads to an additional boost to macro-economic welfare, 
adding almost USD 2 billion annually. The second feature, trade facilitation, brings further 
gains, as goods can now be imported cheaper in all regions.12 In this study, trade 
facilitation is implemented as a gain to be had at zero costs, which, as discussed in a 
section below, has serious implications for the feasibility of results. 
 Another component of welfare changes in the model is the terms of trade. By 
definition, terms of trade effects net out on the global level. It is, however, interesting to 
see the distribution of gains and losses over the twelve regions and sub-regions. In Africa, 
reforms result in a deterioration of the terms of trade and this has a negative effect on 
welfare. The composition of African exports (biased towards primary commodities) and its 
imports (biased towards manufactures) is instrumental in explaining the loss in the terms of 
trade. We shall return to the terms of trade below. Finally, we have to account for the 
change in the price of domestic savings relative to the price of foreign savings. This is 
similar to a terms of trade effect in our model, since each region 'exports' capital goods to 
the global bank and 'imports' savings from the global bank.  
 
 
Table 6.1 Decomposition of global welfare effects under full liberalisation (mln USD) a)  
 
 Allocative Employment Trade Terms Terms Total 
 effects effects facilitation of trade of trade'  
     (capital  
     account)  
 
North Africa 2,713 431 424 -1,390 -284 1,894 
Sub-Sahara Africa 1,025 821 223 -623 -357 1,089 
Southern Africa 752 723 89 -21 50 1,593 
EU-15 16,563 0 6,443 -8,047 1,744 16,702 
US/Canada 4,005 0 2,003 -5,111 -477 420 
South America 6,474 0 1,097 1,039 -216 8,394 
Australia/New Zealand 106 0 127 4,578 71 4,881 
High-income Asia 13,545 0 3,091 8,957 -738 24,855 
China 4,614 0 885 1,204 394 7,097 
Other Asia 5,376 0 944 -476 -9 5,835 
Transition countries 510 0 553 -684 -447 -67 
Rest of world 13,571 0 2,565 335 267 16,737 
Total 69,254 1,975 18,442 -238 -2 89,431 
Share 77% 2% 21% 0% 0% 100%  
 
a) Welfare effects based on an equivalent variation measure. 
                                                 
12 Technically, we model 'iceberg' trade cost. That is, a certain percentage of the commodity 'melts' away 
when shipped abroad. The amount of loss due to this melting is reduced with trade facilitation.  
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 It should be noted that a terms of trade deterioration has two opposing effects in the 
model. On the one hand it reduces the international purchasing power of income earned on 
African exports. On the other hand, it makes African exports cheaper or more competitive 
on world markets, thereby increasing exports and income. The net welfare effect of a terms 
of trade deterioration therefore depends on which effect dominates. Appendix Table 2 
shows the per cent change in the terms of trade for all regions in the model under the three 
different liberalisation scenarios. A deterioration in terms of trade means that the prices 
received for exports fall relative to the prices paid for imports. It can be seen from the table 
that all regions, except the EU-15, the transition countries and the African region, 
experience an improvement in their terms of trade after reform. The result for Africa is that 
the improvement in agricultural export performance acts as an important driver of African 
welfare gains under full reform. The lowering, and eventually phasing out, of trade 
restrictions opens avenues for African exports on OECD markets, especially in those 
agricultural products which will see a decline in production in OECD countries as a 
consequence of reduced support there.  
 What drives the change in relative import and export prices? Part of it is explained by 
the presence of unemployment in the model: by specification, nominal wages for unskilled 
labour are fixed in Africa such that unskilled labour cost do not rise much in real terms. 
Simultaneously - in accordance with standard trade theory - labour costs do rise in other 
regions where exports of labour-intensive products expand. As employment is fixed in all 
non-African regions, the increased use of labour resources drives up the wage there. In the 
process, African exports become cheaper to the rest of the world.  
 
Comparing results across studies 
The estimated USD 84 billion global gains (0.3 per cent of GDP) from a full liberalisation 
of border and support measures are quite modest compared to outcomes of recent studies. 
For example, as shown in Figure 6.2, the gains for the Sub-Sahara African region from this 
study are less than those reported in other studies. The welfare gains reported in earlier 
studies are around USD 2 billion, compared to USD 704 million in the present study. The 
difference can be attributed to the fact that the dimensions, model specification and the 
underlying country aggregations, differ across studies. The studies mentioned do not 
incorporate trade preferences and this plays and important role in the results. However, 
sub-Saharan African countries are involved in a number of preferential trading 
arrangements. By failing to take this into account, previous studies ignore the issue of 
preference erosion, thereby overestimating the welfare gains received by sub-Saharan 
Africa from a full liberalisation for trade.  
 Note that the current study may just as well have overstated the consequences of 
preference erosion. The scenarios presented here assume that the estimated preference 
margins effectively reduce the tariffs that African exporters are facing in the markets of 
OECD countries. Various observers (e.g., UNCTAD, 2001) have pointed to the low rate of 
utilisation of preferences, citing lack of transparency, complex procedures and rules of 
origin as the main reasons for the ineffectiveness of the current preference schemes. If 
indeed African exporters are not exploiting fully the benefits of the preferential 
arrangements, then, obviously, there is not much actual erosion taking place if market 
access is improved for all members participating in the Doha round. Therefore, if 
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preferences are unused, Sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to benefit from 'early harvest' or 
partial reforms. 
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Figure 6.2 Estimates of welfare gains in Sub-Sahara Africa under full liberalisation of border protection 
and domestic support measures 
 
 
6.2 Trade and specialisation 
 
- Reform affects the pattern of international specialisation in the world economy; 
- Industrial expansion occurs mainly in OECD countries, not developing countries; 
- South-American countries expand production of commodities previously subsidised 
by OECD countries (the program commodities), and agro industries; 
- Africa shifts resources into program commodities. 
 
6.2.1 The global picture 
 
The reduction of trade distorting border measures and domestic policies in all countries 
leads to a shift in resource allocation within economies and between economies. As certain 
activities shrink with the removal of distortions, resources are freed that are subsequently 
employed elsewhere in the economy. As a consequence, countries tend to specialise more 
in those activities in which they have a comparative advantage. That is, they specialise in 
goods that use relatively intensively the abundant production factors. Hence, we expect to 
observe shifts in the international specialisation of activities in the results and this is indeed 
the case.  
 A measure of specialisation is given by the specialisation index, which reveals a 
country's net trade position by product.13 The top panel of table 6.2 shows the global 
specialisation pattern prior to reform. Across the sectors identified, in Australia/New 
                                                 
13 The specialisation index is the ratio of the trade balance over the trade volume: (X-M)/(X+M)*100. If this 
measure takes the value –100, all the country's trade in this product is imports, if it is +100 all the trade is 
exports.  
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Zealand specialisation is deepest, and approaches total specialisation in livestock products. 
In North America, South America and Asia specialisation goes to substantial depth, as the 
absolute value of indices reach 30 to 40. In Africa, and more so in Europe, the extent of 
specialisation is modest. Africa is a net exporter in agriculture (crops and livestock), and a 
net importer in agro-processed products. 
 The lower panel of the table shows the changes to the index (in per cent point) under 
a full liberalisation experiment. The numbers in both panels can be added to arrive at post-
reform index levels. While the African continent, South America and Asia are able to 
specialise more in crops and livestock products, and reduce their need for imports of 
processed foods, the reverse can be observed in Europe. North America is currently a net 
exporter of agricultural products, and remains so after reform. The Australia & New 
Zealand region expands its trade in processed foods.  
 The 'cost' to be paid for more specialisation in agricultural products is a shift of 
resources away from industry and manufacturing. In the (enlarged) Europe and North 
America we see an increased specialisation in industry, while Asia is able to expand in 
labour intensive light manufacturing.14 
 
Table 6.2 Specialisation index, before reform and after full reform a) 
 
 
BASE (%) Africa Europe North South Asia AusNZ Rest of  
   America America    World 
 
 
Crops 7 -16 36 45 -30 71 -32 
Livestock products 15 -3 21 3 -43 91 -16 
Agro processing -16 8 5 23 -33 66 -32 
Light manufacturing -2 -6 -26 2 29 -23 -19 
Industry & extraction 1 2 -9 -12 4 -15 10 
Services -11 -1 13 -8 -4 6 -9 
Total -2 0 -5 -4 4 1 1 
 
 
 
CHANGE Africa Europe North South Asia AusNZ Rest of  
(%-points)   America America   World 
 
 
Crops 5 -10 1 1 7 -3 4 
Livestock products 19 -4 6 6 6 -4 4 
Agro processing 5 -9 9 16 1 14 11 
Light manufacturing -4 -1 -8 -8 1 -18 2 
Industry & extraction -4 1 1 -2 -1 -9 -2 
Services 0 2 2 -3 -4 -11 -2 
Total -2 0 1 0 -1 -1 -1 
 
 
a) A positive number indicates a net exporting position; a negative number indicates net imports. See 
footnote 13. Numbers in the top and lower panel can be added to derive the post-reform index. 
Source: trade data in the GTAP database v5.3, and model simulations. 
                                                 
14 In this regard it is important to mention that our baseline already incorporates the phasing out of the export 
quota on textiles and garments under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). Any further changes in 
the textiles and garments sectors stem from the reduction of import tariffs, and are rather small compared to 
the effect of the ATC. See Van Tongeren and Huang (2004) for an analysis of ATC phase out. 
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6.2.2 Specialisation in Africa 
 
Against the background of a change in global specialisation, what is the impact on the 
three African regions and the thirteen sectors in the economy?  
 For each of the regions, current specialisation patterns can be observed from the left 
columns of Table 6.3. Africa clearly finances agricultural imports with export revenues 
from the extraction industries, mining and oil. All regions are net importers of cereals and 
oilseeds, and net exporters of vegetables. North Africa is a net exporter in light industries, 
and relies heavily on agricultural imports in almost all products. Cereal and oilseed imports 
partly serve the substantial animal products industry. Sub-Sahara Africa is almost fully 
specialised in crops and a major net importer in industrial products. Southern Africa is also 
a net importer in agriculture, except for cereals, oilseeds and cotton, and shows deep 
specialisation in the sugar sector. Its trade balance in manufactures approaches zero. From 
Appendix Table 3, which reports further detail on exports, imports and output, it is clear 
that agriculture accounts for but a small share of total trade. The African economies are not 
all that integrated into the world economy: the added sum of exports and imports flows 
amount to just 1/4th to 1/3rd of output. The specialisation of sub-Saharan agriculture in 
exported commodities shows in the sector 'other crops', which includes cocoa, coffee, tea, 
tobacco, groundnuts and spices.15 Note that the processed food sector ('ProFood') is the 
most important agricultural sector in terms of output and imports.16 The manufacturing 
sectors are important both in terms of output and imports. The service economy (other 
services in the table) is large in all regions, reflecting large government and large sums of 
value-added generated by financial services and the like. There is a substantial African 
transport sector ('trade').  
 
                                                 
15 The sector 'Other crops' further covers a variety of commodities (roots and tubers) and high-value products 
(cut flowers, seeds).  
16 Processed food is a wide aggregate that consists of meat and dairy products, processed fisheries products, 
beverages and tobacco, and all other processed food products. 
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Table 6.3 Specialisation index for Africa under base and after full liberalisation, by region and sector 
(%) a) 
 
 
 North Africa Sub-Sahara Africa Southern Africa 
    
 Base Full Base Full Base Full 
 
 
Cereals -92 -80 -78 -58 -8 9 
Vegetable 28 23 65 58 87 83 
Oilseeds -63 -53 -9 4 -64 -64 
Sugar -88 -75 -2 30 76 78 
Cotton -32 -11 93 95 -15 -5 
OCrops -74 -74 94 92 16 6 
Animal -16 11 38 57 36 50 
ProFOOD -39 -27 -10 -4 11 11 
Extract 84 85 89 89 44 44 
Light 6 4 -22 -30 -3 -10 
Industry -51 -52 -58 -58 0 -4 
Trade 37 38 -53 -52 8 8 
Services 9 10 -26 -27 0 -1 
 
 
a) The index ranges between –100 (all trade are imports) and +100 (all trade are exports). See footnote 13 for 
detail on the index. Base refers to baseline data; full to results in the full reform scenario. 
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
 A view at the deepening specialisation in agriculture under a full liberalisation 
reveals, in fact, that it is composed of two counteracting effects. (See the right columns in 
Table 6.3 for the specialisation index after reform. Changes in trade volume relative to 
base are revealed in Appendix Table 4 and Appendix Table 5). First, the results show both 
import substitution and increased exports in the program commodities (i.e. the agricultural 
goods that currently benefit from heavy protection in OECD countries), including sugar, 
cotton and oilseed crops, as well as beef and dairy products. Exports increases are notable 
for cereals, sugar and cotton but absolute volume changes are small. In general, the 
displacement of imports in program commodities into Africa by home production is an 
important driver of the simulation results. 
 Second, there is a move away from commodities with both modest levels of 
protection in OECD countries and large value-added, such as vegetables and flowers 
(included in other crops). Exports decline in these sectors, especially to the loss of Sub-
Sahara Africa (SSA). Only in North Africa exports of these products grow. The processed 
food sector generates moderate results; under a total liberalisation exports increase largely 
in all African regions, under less ambitious reform the processed food performance varies. 
Unfortunately, the aggregate level of results limits the detail on the important sector 'other 
crops', which includes most of African traditional export commodities. 
 While manufacture exports from both light and heavy industry increase for all 
African regions, imports grow even more. As discussed above, these effects relate to 
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changes in the terms of trade. Exports of extraction products (extract), the most important 
export good, grow steadily with the comprehensiveness of reform.17  
 The pattern to the import and export changes that result from reform is clear: Africa 
displays an import substitution in grains, sugar and cotton that is driven by policy changes 
towards these program crops in OECD countries. Agricultural production in the African 
regions moves partly away from other commodities and horticulture products, and the 
share of light and heavy industry in trade declines. Figure 6.3 presents a graphical 
demonstration. The graph reports changes to the specialisation index when moving from 
modest to full reform, for Africa and the EU-15, Africa's main trade partner. Given that a 
move from a reform of Little to Modest depth renders small specialisation effects, the 
graph helps to explain the jump in results between partial reform and a comprehensive 
liberalisation. 
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Figure 6.3 Altered specialisation in Africa and EU-15 when moving from modest to full reform (change to 
the specialisation index in %-points) 
 
 
                                                 
17 The aggregate extraction sector consists of basic products from forestry, fishing, and the extraction of coal, 
oil, gas and minerals.  
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6.3 Changing structure of production 
 
- African economies move more into the supply of commodities that currently receive 
support in OECD countries; 
- Simultaneously they move away from non-subsidised commodities and agricultural 
goods with large value-added; 
- In some countries, factors of production now in manufacturing shift into agriculture; 
- Risk of de-industrialisation in Africa. 
 
 The resulting output changes follow the pattern of international specialisation. While 
the African regions expand output in cereals, sugar and cotton, and moderately in animal 
products, output declines in commodities like vegetables, fruit and flowers and commodity 
crops. Not only are resources reallocated within agriculture, light and heavy industry 
contracts in all African regions. Under little reform, industrial activity reduces by less than 
1 per cent, under modest reform 2 to 4 per cent. Under full reform, the impact differs 
across regions. There are substantial reductions in the Sub-Saharan and Southern African 
regions amounting up to 9 per cent activity loss. After reform, African governments face 
quite a substantial loss of revenue from import duties on manufacturing imports. The 
output effects, presented in Appendix Table 7 and summarised for Sub-Sahara Africa in 
Table 6.4, point to a de-industrialisation tendency in all African sub-regions - the flip side 
of deeper specialisation in agriculture. In the comparative static general equilibrium model, 
it becomes more efficient to specialise in those activities that use intensively the relatively 
abundant production factors, i.e. (unskilled) labour.18 Since industrial activities use the 
relatively scarce capital inputs, these activities tend to decline.  
 
 
Table 6.4 Share of agriculture and food in output in Sub-Sahara Africa 
 
 
 Before reform After reform 
 
 
Total economy including services: 
 Agriculture  0.38 0.39 
 Non-agriculture 0.62 0.61 
 
Merchandise economy:   
 Agriculture  0.72 0.74 
 Non-agriculture 0.28 0.26 
 
 
Source: Model simulations. 
 
 
 In as far as the industrial sector is the main engine for future growth, the de-
industrialisation tendency produced by our model is an alarming signal. Such effects have 
been discussed in the 'new economic geography' literature which shows that regions that 
                                                 
18 The fixing of nominal wages for unskilled labour in the African region further induces this process, as it 
makes skilled labour the scarce factor in Africa, driving skilled wages upwards relative to unskilled wages.  
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are similar (or even identical) in their structure (endowments, technology) can 
endogenously differentiate into rich 'core' regions and poor 'peripheral' regions in the 
presence of increasing returns to scale. If industry can be characterised by increasing 
returns, and agriculture by constant returns, then a shift away from industry will lead to a 
low-level growth path compared to the growth in regions that are specializing more in 
industrial activities.19 
 In the model simulations, the production factors move towards those activities that 
yield the relatively highest returns, and changes in relative prices are important drivers of 
adjustments between scenarios. Factor prices in Africa increase after full reform, as 
economic activity grows. All factor prices reflect the demand for factors of production 
except for the unskilled wage. The nominal wage rate for unskilled labour is fixed by 
specification, while the real wage rate adjusts to labour demand. Rising by 4 to 8 per cent 
across the continent, land prices rise most, a logical fact given the deeper specialisation in 
land-intensive agriculture such as cereals, cotton, sugar and husbandry (see Appendix 
Table 8). Factor prices decrease in the regions Sub-Sahara Africa and Southern Africa 
under minor and moderate reform, reflecting the downscale in economic activity in these 
regions.  
 
 
A closer look at developments in cereal trade is instructive for understanding the drive towards import 
substitution in program crops. Before reform, most African imports of wheat, rice and other grains are 
produced in the US and EU. Farm-income support to cereal farmers in these countries amounts to over 40 
billion dollars, and keeps export prices low. Consequently, the US and EU supply half of North African, and 
80 per cent of Sub-Sahara African cereals imports. South America and Southern Africa have far lower shares 
in this trade. Even minor reductions in support render cereal production far less attractive to European and 
American farmers, and output contracts strongly.20 One would reason that African importers just seek 
replacing trade in other developing countries but the balance of trade constrains this: African producers loose 
much of their horticulture exports to US and EU farmers. Also, Africa cannot take over EU and US export 
markets for cereals under minor and modest trade reform, because preference margins for African products 
erode. As a result, Africa is forced to produce cereals that were previously imported, but at an inefficient 
scale. Only under full reform can Africa specialise far enough into agriculture to allow for positive allocation 
gains. 
Box 1 Import substitution in program crops 
 
 
Trade liberalisation and employment 
As explained above, we specified the model such that the employment rate for unskilled 
workers adjusts endogenously. Figure 6.4 shows that under the scenarios specified trade 
reform has limited impact on the employment of unskilled workers. In Sub-Sahara Africa 
and Southern Africa minor and moderate trade reform results in decreased employment of 
unskilled workers. Some sectors draw additional unskilled labour into the wage economy, 
as real wages drop. But the contraction of labour intensive activities in such sectors as 
                                                 
19 A survey of the new economic geography is provided in Ottaviano and Puga (1998). See Francois et al. 
(2003) for an analysis of the regional impact of increasing returns in the setting of a global trade 
liberalisation. 
20 For example, after a simulated full reduction of support and border measures cereal and cotton output in 
the EU drop by 40 per cent, and sugar production decreases by 25 per cent. 
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horticulture and textiles & clothing and the like leads to a net reduction of unskilled labour 
employment in the partial reform scenarios. Accordingly, to substitute unskilled labour 
with other factors reduces production costs. North Africa shows a positive employment 
effect in all scenarios, as do all regions under the full liberalisation scenario. Then, the 
additional purchasing power generated by the positive employment impact creates a 
beneficial multiplier effect in African economies, thereby resulting in large welfare gains. 
 
 
-1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0,0 0,4 0,8 1,2
North Africa
Sub-Sahara
Africa
Southern Africa
Full reform
Modest reform
Little reform
 
Figure 6.4 Employment effects, % change to base number employed 
 
 
 The above describes the structural transformation in the African regions as they 
appear after a simulated round of trade liberalisation. Each of the three scenarios is 
composed of five policy instruments. One wants, however, to bring to the negotiation table 
data on the impact of single policies such that priorities and trade-offs can be assessed. The 
following sections contribute to this debate by relating aggregate welfare effects for the 
African regions to policy changes in OECD countries, in Africa, and in other non-OECD 
countries. 
 
 
6.4 Domestic support and border measures 
 
- From the three pillars, agricultural market access and domestic support are the most  
 important for Africa; 
- NA and SA will benefit both from improved market access and reduced domestic 
support measures because they do not benefit from trade preferences and operate in 
the internationally competing markets; 
- SSA does not benefit from little and modest reform due to preference erosion, 
increased competition and reduced employment; 
- Under full reform, SSA will benefit largely from export increases under improved 
market access. 
 
 This section contributes to the debate on the relative importance of the three pillars 
in the agriculture negotiations - export competition, market access, and domestic support 
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measures - on African economies. The results indicate that as we move from little and 
modest reforms to full reform, the gains to all sub-regions increase significantly. However, 
the different sub-regions within Africa are affected differently by the three different forms 
of agricultural support provided to farmers in OECD countries. Table 6.5 decomposes the 
welfare effects along the two policy instruments and along the region in which the policy 
change takes place. Detail on the other three policies considered in this study (export 
competition in agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA) and trade facilitation) 
is provided in Appendix Table 10 to Appendix Table 12. 
This study finds that market access and domestic support are the most important 
policy issues for North and Southern Africa in the agriculture negotiations. This has to do 
with the fact that most countries in these regions do not benefit from trade preferences 
given to ACP countries. While the Sub-Saharan African region experiences losses under 
the little and modest reform scenarios, it gains under both market access and domestic 
support measures in the full scenario, although the gains are larger under the former. These 
results are due to the fact that Sub-Saharan African countries experience preference erosion 
as well as increased competition in international markets under modest and little scenario. 
For full liberalisation, improved market access and the resulting increase in allocative 
efficiency resulting from specialisation outweighs the loss due to preference erosion as 
well as deteriorations in the terms of trade, and so the region experiences a net gain.  
 The region North Africa faces some losses in all scenarios from an export subsidy 
reduction in OECD countries. As an importer of subsidised exports North Africa has to 
deal with price increases. The situation is different for Southern Africa where exports are 
in fact facilitated when the OECD reduces its export subsidies. Accordingly, and to no 
surprise, Southern Africa shows positive welfare effects. 
 
 
Table 6.5 Welfare impact of global agricultural reform on African regions: market access & domestic 
support (mln. USD) 
 
 
Affected region Scenario Agricultural Domestic support 
  market access 
 
 
North Africa Little 197 125 
  Modest 391 280 
  Full 578 595 
Sub-Sahara Africa Little -242 -221 
  Modest -175 -117 
  Full 933 328 
Southern Africa Little -125 89 
  Modest -139 220 
  Full 336 449 
 
 
Source: Model simulations. 
 
 
 The impact of tariff reductions by OECD countries is different. Minor tariff 
reductions on imports into the OECD result in welfare losses for the African regions 
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between 63 and 371 million dollar (Appendix Table 10 to Appendix Table 12). Since the 
African regions have preferential access to most of the OECD countries their position 
erodes vis-à-vis their competitors. Stronger tariff reductions under the modest and full 
scenarios have a positive impact on North Africa, as is clear from the tables in the 
Appendix. 
 A reduction of domestic support in the OECD countries has two effects. First, due to 
a reduction of subsidies the production costs of agricultural goods rise and the outputs 
decrease. Second, land rents decline as a consequence of lower agricultural production. 
The effect is a decrease of production costs. As a result agricultural goods in OECD 
countries with modest protection like vegetable and other crops can improve their 
competitiveness. At the same time the output of strongly protected commodities (cereals, 
sugar and cotton) declines. Dependent on their export pattern the regions North Africa and 
Southern Africa take advantage of a domestic support reduction in OECD countries. For 
the region Sub-Sahara Africa the resulting welfare effect depends on the degree of the 
liberalisation. Sub-Sahara Africa suffers welfare losses in the little and modest scenarios, 
while the full reform scenario is beneficial. 
 
 
6.5 Trade facilitation 
 
Trade facilitation is one of the four Singapore Issues that have generated so much 
controversy in the current round of trade talks. It was also one of the key issues that led to 
the collapse of the Fifth WTO ministerial conference in Cancun, Mexico. African countries 
have been opposed to the launching of negotiations in this area partly because they are not 
sure of the economic consequences for their economies and also because they fear that it 
may lead to huge implementation costs. Consequently, they are of the view that there is the 
need for more work to be done in this area before a decision is taken on whether or not 
negotiations should be launched in this area. In this section, we examine the impact of 
trade liberalisation on the African region and also on other regions of the world. In the 
model trade facilitation reduces transactions costs associated with international trade in an 
'iceberg' specification.  
 Trade facilitation accounts for 736 million (or 16 per cent) of the net African 
welfare gain under full reform. The impact of trade facilitation on African economies 
under different degrees of liberalisation is shown in Appendix Table 10 to Appendix Table 
12. Three points are evident from these results. First, all African regions derive gains from 
trade facilitation irrespective of whether the reform is partial or complete. The critical 
factor here is that the reform must be carried-out by all regions. Second, North Africa 
derives more gain from trade facilitation than Southern and Sub-Saharan African countries. 
For example, in the full liberalisation scenario, North Africa gains USD 322 million while 
the gains for Southern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are USD 113 million and USD 84 
million respectively. Third, unilateral trade facilitation in other developing and transition 
economies hurts countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the full liberalisation scenario, 
unilateral trade facilitation in non-African developing and transition economies results in 
an income loss in Sub-Saharan Africa of USD 10 million. This may be due to the fact that 
countries in the sub-region compete with other developing countries and so when they 
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unilaterally engage in trade facilitation their transactions costs fall thereby increasing their 
degree of competitiveness relative to the Sub-Saharan African region. 
 These positive results on trade facilitation should however be interpreted with 
caution because the study does not incorporate the implementation costs of trade 
facilitation for African countries. To the extent that these costs are large, they may 
outweigh the gains derived in this study. 
 
 
6.6 Non-Agricultural Market Access 
 
The negotiations in the field of non-agricultural market access (NAMA) are presented as a 
conflict between OECD and non-OECD countries. This can partly be understood from the 
composition and level of tariffs on manufactures. There are at least two relevant 
observations from the analysis of market access for imports from Africa into other regions 
of the world in Chapter 3. First, in general, non-OECD countries apply more border 
protection to manufactures than OECD countries. Second, tariff schedules in non-OECD 
countries reveal more binding overhang. 
 Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) raises a number of issues for Africa. First, 
is the potential loss of government tariff revenue that may result from liberalisation and the 
likely impact on Africa. In several countries in the region, import duties represent a 
substantial part of government revenue. The second point is that Africa is currently a net 
importer of industrial goods (both light and heavy) and may, in fact, move even further 
away from industrial activity if there is trade reform.  
 The simulation results provide some indicative results on the net welfare effects. 
Despite some bleak expectations, Africa reaps a modest national income gain of USD 224 
million from a full liberalisation of border measures for manufactures (all else equal), as 
can be seen in the diagram below. Under partial reforms, however, the losses in tariff 
revenue outweigh gains from improved export performance and reduced import prices. 
There are losses to be incurred both under reform of Little and Modest scope. Underlying 
the small difference in net effect are possible large deviations in - when moving from little 
to modest reform - tariff revenue loss and export gains. The results for the three sub-
regions are broadly consistent with Figure 6.5, except that Sub-Sahara Africa also incurs a 
net loss under full reform. 
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Figure 6.5 Welfare impact on Africa from NAMA reform (mln USD) 
 
 
6.7 Dynamic Effects 
 
The analysis so far concentrates on the static (or direct) welfare gains from liberalisation. 
These gains result from an improved allocation of resources. No fresh resources are 
injected into the global economy, except for un(der)utilised labour in African countries. 
The estimated effects on employment are, however, very limited, as labour intensive 
activities in African economies do not expand very much in the simulations. Alternatively, 
one could consider whether trade liberalisation induces shifts in the regional pattern of 
savings and investment.  
 Relating to classical models of capital accumulation and growth, rather than to 
endogenous growth mechanisms, capital shifts have been explored extensively in the trade 
literature.21 The scope of these 'accumulation effects' depends on a number of factors, 
including the marginal product of capital, country risk and underlying savings behaviour. 
In this section, we work with a classical savings-investment mechanism (discussed in 
Francois et al., 1997). This means we model long-run linkages between changes in income, 
savings, and investment. The results reported here therefore include changes in the capital 
stock, and the medium- to long-run implications of such changes. 
 For the dynamic analysis, the model specification is changed to allow for the 
endogenous adjustment of each region's capital stock (in the static closure the amount of 
capital is fixed in each region). This is achieved by a so-called 'Baldwin closure', which 
mimics classical savings behaviour: the savings rate is fixed and the economy moves from 
one (pre-reform) steady state to a new (post-reform) steady state. The global bank 
disburses global savings in such a way as to maintain the regional composition of its 
investment portfolio, and hence regional differences in return to capital persist.22 
 Welfare results of the model with capital accumulation are presented in Table 6.6 
(the left panel of which reproduces the results from the static model). The key differences 
                                                 
21 Research in this area includes Baldwin and Francois (1999), Smith (1976, 1977), and Srinivasan and 
Bhagwati (1980).  
22 See Francois et al. (1996) for an implementation in the GTAP framework. 
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between the results from the static model and those from the dynamic model are as 
follows. First, the introduction of capital accumulation increases the welfare gains to most 
regions in each of the liberalisation scenarios. For example, the global welfare gain under 
full liberalisation jumps from 0.3 per cent to 0.7 per cent of global GDP, or from USD 84 
billion to USD 201 billion (see Appendix Table 13) for 1997 dollar terms). Second, there is 
a tremendous increase in the welfare gains to Sub-Saharan Africa. In the full liberalisation 
scenario, welfare increases from USD 704 million to USD 4.3 billion, that is six times as 
large as in the static model. In fact, Sub-Sahara Africa, shortly followed by the region other 
Asia, experiences the biggest growth in the capital stock. Under full reform, the capital 
stock grows by about 5 per cent in these regions, against a world average growth of just 
over 1 per cent. Moreover, unlike in the static model, Sub-Saharan Africa derives welfare 
gains in the moderate liberalisation scenario. Finally, when expressed as a percentage of 
base GDP, the gains to Sub-Saharan Africa in the full liberalisation scenario are far greater 
than those accruing to the world. For Sub-Saharan Africa it is 2.1 per cent of base GDP 
while for the world it is 0.7 per cent. 
 The simulations with capital accumulation clearly highlight the importance of 
complementing trade liberalisation with investment enhancing policies. Without additional 
investments in the domestic economy the opportunities of trade liberalisation remain 
largely untapped in Africa. A successful conclusion of the DDA can contribute to this. As 
the simulation results confirm, investments are instrumental in achieving output growth, 
enhanced labour productivity, and rising wages. 
 
 
Table 6.6 National income gains as a percentage of base GDP 
 
 
 Static Model Dynamic Model  
   
 Little Modest Full Little Modest Full 
 
 
North Africa 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.9 
Sub-Sahara Africa -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.2 2.1 
Southern Africa -0.1 0.1 0.9 -0.1 0.0 1.3 
EU-15 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 
US/Canada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
South America 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.5 
Australia/New Zealand 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.7 2.2 
High-income Asia 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.6 
China 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 1.0 
Other Asia 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.2 2.2 
Transition countries 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 
Rest of world 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.7 1.7 
Total 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.7 
 
 
* Based on Equivalent Variation. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
 
This study provides a quantitative estimate of the potential economic consequences of 
multilateral trade reform for Africa using the GTAP model. It focuses on impacts at the 
sub-regional level because most African countries are not in the GTAP database. 
Consequently, there have been no attempts to transfer general conclusions to the country 
level because of the wide variety of economic conditions in African countries.  
 Three types of reform scenarios are considered: 'little', 'modest,' and 'full' 
liberalisation scenarios. Our model results indicate that benefits increase with the depth of 
reforms. North Africa benefits from all liberalisation efforts, be they comprehensive or 
partial. Sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, Southern Africa incurs welfare losses 
when a partial liberalisation is carried out, reflecting largely the combined impact of 
preference erosion and binding overhang.  
 Furthermore, whilst the African region would benefit from a comprehensive trade 
liberalisation, any measure of reform will likely imply heavy risks on certain economies 
and specific sectors. Under full reform the reduction of agricultural support allows far 
reaching specialisation in cereals, cotton and sugar. In order to accommodate the change 
African producers partly abandon commodity crops and horticulture. The African export 
position in these products on European markets worsens as preference erosion opens 
opportunities for competitors from South America and Asia. Labour resources are drawn 
into agriculture, which creates some new employment opportunities, and takes away some 
in the contracting manufacturing sectors. This adjustment drives the large 'kink' that occurs 
between the results of minor/modest reform and of full reform of all trade-distorting border 
and support measures. Whether the allocation of more resources in agriculture, and the 
move away from manufactures is progress or regress in terms of development of the 
African region, is a matter of debate.  
 The model simulations presented here assume that the estimated preference margins 
effectively reduce the tariffs that African exporters are facing. Consequently the value of 
these preferences is eroded if market access is improved multilaterally and globally. This 
may not be realistic in the face low rates of preference utilisation. If African exporters are 
currently not making use of preference margins, then the actual erosion and concurring 
losses will be limited. Stated otherwise, the lower the actual use of preference, the more 
Africa will gain from early harvest trade reforms. 
 Regarding NAMA, the results indicate that the African region is also vulnerable to 
partial reforms due largely to the potential loss of tariff revenue. Several countries in the 
region rely on trade taxes and so partial liberalisation that does not yield significant market 
access to the region's exports is likely to result in welfare losses for the region.  
 On trade facilitation, the results suggest that Africa would derive positive benefits 
from this area of negotiations. This, however, should be interpreted with caution because 
the study does not incorporate the costs of implementation of trade facilitation in the 
African region. An interesting result on trade facilitation is that countries in the African 
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region would incur losses if they do not reciprocate any actions made by other developing 
countries to facilitate trade.  
 The introduction of dynamic effects in the model, through capital accumulation, 
increases the welfare benefits from trade reform in all regions of the world. For example, 
the gains to Sub-Sahara Africa in the dynamic model are six times larger than in the static 
model. Sub-Saharan Africa attracts large amounts of funds from global capital markets, 
which results in a jump in welfare gains to the sub-region. This points to the need for 
domestic policies in Africa aimed at stability and investor confidence that complement 
trade reform. 
 What are the implications of our findings for the Doha round of trade negotiations? 
First, the study stresses the need for reforms to be as comprehensive as possible. Second, it 
underscores the vulnerability of African countries to partial trade reforms. Clearly, nobody 
expects a full liberalisation of trade under the Doha round and so it is not a feasible option. 
That leaves us with some consensus scenario of partial reform. All but the African partners 
to the negotiations have an incentive to support partial reforms since they will derive 
positive benefits. Consequently, to ensure that partial reforms do not have serious adverse 
effects on the African region, WTO members need to find appropriate mechanisms to 
make special and differential treatment a more effective instrument for development in 
Africa and other least developed countries. 
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Preferential Access
Shock A 
Shock B 
Correction B 
Shock C 
Correction C 
Appendix A Adjusting Tariffs for Preferences and Binding  
   Overhang 
 
 
The GTAP database comprises bound tariff rates. However, in most countries bound rates 
are different from applied rates and this has implications for trade reforms. There are two 
reasons. First, some countries apply lower tariffs in order to provide cheaper imports to 
domestic consumers. Nevertheless, the negotiation of the WTO refers to the bound rates. 
While the EU and NAM apply their bound rates, developing countries show impressive 
difference between bound and applied rates. A tariff reduction on bound rates means that 
the EU and NAM reduce their applied tariffs more than other regions. 
 Second, the QUAD countries23 allow developing countries a preferential access, 
meaning they apply tariffs even lower than the applied rate. In order to introduce the real 
tariff cuts we have to take account of the differences between bound and applied rates on 
the one hand and bound rate and preferential access on the other (Figure A1.1). If tariffs 
are completely eliminated and there is no difference between bound and applied rates we 
use shock A.24 In the case of the applied rate in Figure A1.1 shock B is suitable. 
Accordingly, we have to alter the shock A with the correction B.25 Otherwise we would 
overestimate the tariff cut and simulation results would not be reliable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1.1 Bound and Applied Tariff Rate as well as Preferential Access 
                                                 
23 The QUAD countries comprise the EU, Canada the USA as well as Japan. Furthermore, we assume that 
CEEC is applying the same preferences as the EU15. In the data preparation step C (Figure 1) we adjust the 
border protection of the CEEC towards the level of the EU15.  
24 In general equilibrium modeling 'shock' means exogenous change.  
25 Assuming a small reduction of the bound rate, say –10%, and an applied rate of 80% the new bound rate 
would still be higher than the actual applied rate. In this case no shock is used because nothing is changing. 
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 The difference between applied and bound tariff rates is also known as 'water in the 
tariff'. We use information from Francois and Martin (2002) as well as Walkenhorst and 
Dihel (2003) to calculate the correction B. For the correction C we require information 
about the treatment of African exports in the QUAD countries, which are in our 
aggregation included in the regions EU15, CEEC, NAM and HiASIA. Hoekman et al. 
(2001) provide preferential rates of the QUAD countries. We aggregate them for the 
sectors presented in section 5.2. 
 There are three different levels of preferences. All African countries are allowed to 
export under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Countries (ACP) get a more favourable access to the European Union than the 
GSP. Compared with the APC the Least Developed Countries (LDC) can export under 
even more facilitated conditions.26 Table A1.2 provides an overview of the preferential 
scheme that applies to each African country. 
 
 
Table A1.1 Preferences of African Exporters into QUAD Countries 
 
 
 EU15 NAM HiASIA 
 
 
nAfrica GSP GSP GSP 
SSA ACP-LDC GSP-LDC GSP-LDC 
sAfrica ACP GSP GSP 
 
 
 
 
 Table A1.1 includes the preferences for the regions of our aggregation. All exports of 
North Africa (nAfrica) to the QUAD countries are treated according to the GSP. The 
region Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) includes least developed countries as well as countries 
with a less beneficial export conditions. We assume an average between the LDC and ACP 
or rather GSP preferences. The region South Africa (sAfrica) has an ACP accession to the 
EU while the other QUAD countries are applying the GSP for its exports. 
 
                                                 
26 A detailed discussion of preferences is provided in Achterbosch et al. (2003). 
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Table A1.2 Preferences of African Countries 
Aggregation Country GSP ACP LDC 
Algeria X   
Egypt X   
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya X   
Morocco X   
North Africa  
Tunisia X   
Angola  X X X 
Benin  X X X 
Botswana X X  
Burkina Faso  X X X 
Burundi  X X X 
Cameroon X X  
Cape Verde  X X X 
Central African Republic  X X X 
Chad X X X 
Comoros X X X 
Congo/ Zaire X X  
Democratic Republic of Congo  X X X 
Côte d'Ivoire X X  
Djibouti  X X X 
Equatorial Guinea  X X X 
Eritrea  X X X 
Ethiopia  X X X 
Gabon X X  
Gambia X X X 
Ghana X X  
Guinea  X X X 
Guinea-Bissau  X X X 
Kenya X X  
Liberia X X X 
Madagascar  X X X 
Malawi X X X 
Mali X X X 
Mauritania X X X 
Mauritius X X  
Mayotte X X  
Mozambique X X X 
Niger X X X 
Nigeria X X  
Rwanda X X X 
São Tomé and Príncipe X X X 
Senegal  X X X 
Seychelles X X  
Sierra Leone  X X X 
Somalia  X X X 
Sudan X X X 
Tanzania X X X 
Togo X X X 
Uganda X X X 
Zambia  X X X 
SSA 
Zimbabwe X X  
Lesotho X X X 
Namibia X X  
South Africa X X  South Africa 
Swaziland X X  
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Appendix B Aggregation of GTAP Database 
 
 
 
Table B1.1 Aggregation of 12 Regions 
Abrev. GTAP-Region Abrev. GTAP-Region 
Morocco            MAR Australia  AUS nAfrica Rest of North Africa       XNF AUSNZ New Zealand NZL 
Botswana             BWA Japan               JPN 
Malawi              MWI Korea               KOR 
Mozambique            MOZ Taiwan              TWN 
Tanzania             TZA 
HiASIA 
Singapore             SGP 
Zambia              ZMB China               CHN 
Zimbabwe             ZWE China Hong Kong  HKG 
Other Southern Africa       XSF Indonesia             IDN 
Uganda              UGA Malaysia             MYS 
SSA 
 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa    XSS Philippines            PHL 
sAfrica Rest of South Afr. Custom Union XSC Thailand             THA 
Austria              AUT Vietnam              VNM 
Belgium              BEL Bangladesh            BGD 
Denmark              DNK India               IND 
Finland              FIN Sri Lanka             LKA 
France              FRA Rest of South Asia        XSA 
Germany              DEU 
oASIA 
Rest of South Asia        XSA 
United Kingdom GBR Czech Republic          CZE 
Greece GRC Hungary              HUN 
Ireland              IRL Malta               MLT 
Italy               ITA Poland              POL 
Luxembourg            LUX Slovakia             SVK 
Netherlands NLD Slovenia             SVN 
Portugal             PRT Estonia              EST 
Spain               ESP Latvia              LVA 
EU15 
Sweden              SWE Lithuania             LTU 
Canada              CAN 
CEEC 
Cyprus              CYP NAM United States           USA Switzerland            CHE 
Mexico              MEX Rest of EFTA           XEF 
Central America, Caribbean    XCM Albania ALB 
Colombia             COL Bulgaria             BGR 
Peru               PER Croatia              HRV 
Venezuela             VEN Romania              ROM 
Rest of Andean Pact        XAP Russian Federation RUS 
Argentina  ARG Rest of Former Soviet Union XSU 
Brazil  BRA Turkey              TUR 
Chile  CHL Rest of Middle East        XME 
Uruguay  URY 
ROW 
Rest of World XRW 
SAM 
Rest of South America  XSM  
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Table B1.2 Aggregation of 13 Sectors 
Abrev. GTAP-Sector 
Paddy rice            PDR 
Processed rice          PCR 
Wheat               WHT Cereals 
Cereal grains nec GRO 
Vegetable Vegetables, fruit, nuts      V_F 
Oil Seeds             OSD Oilseeds Vegetable oils and fats      VOL 
Sugar cane, sugar beet      C_B Sugar Sugar processing              SGR 
Cotton Plant-based fibers        PFB 
oCrops Crops nec     OCR 
Cattle,sheep,goats,horses     CTL 
Animal products nec OAP 
Wool, silk-worm cocoons      WOL Animal  
Raw milk             RMK 
Meat of cattle,and sheep CMT 
Meat products nec         OMT 
Dairy products          MIL 
Food products nec         OFD 
proFOOD 
Beverages and tobacco B_T 
Forestry             FOR 
Fishing              FSH 
Coal               COL 
Oil                OIL 
Gas                GAS 
Extract 
Minerals nec           OMN 
Textiles             TEX 
Wearing apparel          WAP 
Leather products         LEA 
Wood products           LUM 
Light 
Paper products, publishing    PPP 
Petroleum, coal products     P_C 
Chemical,rubber,plastic prods   CRP 
Mineral products nec       NMM 
Ferrous metals          I_S 
Metals nec            NFM 
Metal products          FMP 
Motor vehicles and parts     MVH 
Transport equipment nec      OTN 
Electronic equipment       ELE 
Machinery and equipment  OME 
Industry 
Manufactures nec         OMF 
Trade               TRD 
Transport nec           OTP 
Sea transport           WTP Trade 
Air transport           ATP 
Electricity            ELY 
Gas manufacture, distribution   GDT 
Water               WTR 
Construction           CNS 
Communication           CMN 
Financial services nec      OFI 
Insurance             ISR 
Business services nec       OBS 
Recreation and other services   ROS 
PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat  OSG 
Services 
Dwellings             DWE 
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Appendix C An Overview of the Computational Model 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This Appendix provides an overview of the basic structure of the global CGE model 
employed for our assessment of Doha Round-based multilateral trade liberalisation. The 
model is implemented in GEMPACK - a software package designed for solving large 
applied general equilibrium models. The model is solved as an explicit non-linear system 
of equations, through techniques described by Harrison and Pearson (1994). More 
information can be obtained at the following URL – 
www.monash.edu.au/policy/gempack.htm. The reader is referred to Hertel (1996: 
www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/model/Chap2.pdf) for a detailed discussion of the basic 
algebraic model structure represented by the GEMPACK code. While this Appendix 
provides a broad overview of the model, detailed discussion of mathematical structure is 
limited to added features, beyond the standard GTAP structure. 
 The model is a standard multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. 
See Van Tongeren et al. (2001) for a review and assessment of the features of applied 
agricultural trade models. Social accounting data are based on Version 5 of the GTAP 
dataset (McDougall, 2001), with an update to reflect post-Uruguay Round protection, 
Agenda 2000, China's accession to the WTO, and EU enlargement, as discussed in the 
body of the report.  
 
 
2. General structure 
 
The general conceptual structure of a regional economy in the model is represented in 
Figure C1.1. Within each region, firms produce output, employing land, labour, capital, 
and natural resources and combining these with intermediate inputs. Firm output is 
purchased by consumers, government, the investment sector, and by other firms. Firm 
output can also be sold for export. Land is only employed in the agricultural sectors, while 
capital and labour (both skilled and unskilled) are mobile between all production sectors. 
Capital is fully mobile within regions.  
 All demand sources combine imports with domestic goods to produce a composite 
good, as indicated in the figure. In constant returns sectors, these are Armington 
composites. In increasing returns sectors, these are composites of firm-differentiated 
goods. Relevant substitution and trade elasticities are presented in Table C1.1. 
 
 
 82
3. Taxes and policy variables 
 
Taxes are included in the theory of the model at several levels. Production taxes are placed 
on intermediate or primary inputs, or on output. Some trade taxes are modelled at the 
border. Additional internal taxes can be placed on domestic or imported intermediate 
inputs, and may be applied at differential rates that discriminate against imports. Where 
relevant, taxes are also placed on exports, and on primary factor income. Finally, where 
relevant (as indicated by social accounting data) taxes are placed on final consumption, and 
can be applied differentially to consumption of domestic and imported goods. 
Trade policy instruments are represented as import or export taxes/subsidies. This 
includes applied most-favoured nation (mfn) tariffs, antidumping duties, countervailing 
duties, price undertakings, export quotas, and other trade restrictions. One exception are 
service-sector trading costs, which are not covered by the database. Tariff rates for China's 
accession to the WTO are taken from Francois and Spinanger (2001) and Van Tongeren 
and Huang (2004). 
 
 
4. Trade and transportation costs 
 
International trade is modelled as a process that explicitly involves trading costs, which 
include both trade and transportation services. These trading costs reflect the transaction 
costs involved in international trade, as well as the physical activity of transportation itself. 
Those trading costs related to international movement of goods and related logistic services 
are met by composite services purchased from a global trade services sector, where the 
composite 'international trade services' activity is produced as a Cobb-Douglas composite 
of regional exports of trade and transport service exports. Trade-cost margins are based on 
reconciled f.o.b. and c.i.f. trade data, as reported in version 5.3 of the GTAP dataset. 
 
 
5. The composite household and final demand structure  
 
Final demand is determined by an upper-tier Cobb-Douglas preference function, which 
allocates income in fixed shares to current consumption, investment, and government 
services. This yields a fixed savings rate. Government services are produced by a Leontief 
technology, with household/government transfers being endogenous. The lower-tier nest 
for current consumption is also specified as a Cobb-Douglas. The regional capital markets 
adjust so that changes in savings match changes in regional investment expenditures. (Note 
that the Cobb-Douglas demand function is a special case of the CDE demand function 
employed in the standard GTAP model code. It is implemented through GEMPACK 
parameter files.) 
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6. Trade 
 
The basic structure of demand in constant returns sectors is Armington preferences. In 
Armington sectors, goods are differentiated by country of origin, and the similarity of 
goods from different regions is measured by the elasticity of substitution. Formally, within 
a particular region, we assume that demand goods from different regions are aggregated 
into a composite import according to the following CES function: 
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 In equation (5), Mj,i,r is the quantity of Mj from region i consumed in region r. The 
elasticity of substitution between varieties from different regions is then equal to σMj , 
where σMj=1/(1-ρj). Composite imports are combined with the domestic good qD in a 
second CES nest, yielding the Armington composite q.  
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The elasticity of substitution between the domestic good and composite imports is then 
equal to σDj, where σDj=1/(1-βj). At the same time, from the first order conditions, the 
demand for import Mj,i,r can then be shown to equal  
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where EM j,r represents expenditures on imports in region r on the sector j Armington 
composite.  
 
 
7. Capital accumulation 
 
Dynamic effects through capital accumulation are modelled as a classical savings-
investment mechanism (discussed in Francois et al., 1997). This means we model long-run 
linkages between changes in income, savings, and investment. For the dynamic analysis, 
the model specification is changed to allow for the endogenous adjustment of each region's 
capital stock (in the static closure the amount of capital is fixed in each region). This is 
achieved by a so-called 'Baldwin closure', which mimics classical savings behaviour: the 
savings rate is fixed and the economy moves from one (pre-reform) steady state to a new 
(post-reform) steady state. The global bank disburses global savings in such a way as to 
maintain the regional composition of its investment portfolio, and hence regional 
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differences in return to capital persist. The capital accumulation mechanisms are described 
in Francois et al. (1996b: http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/techpapr/tp-7.htm). 
 Technically, we fix each region's trade balance (pre-reform steady state), in order to 
fix the regional savings-investment balance. Each region's investment demand is matched 
by savings from domestic sources and foreign sources. Investment demand is translated 
into capital expansion, which shifts the regional production possibility frontier outward.  
 
 
 
 
Output
Value
Added
Composite
Goods
Imports
Capital, Land,  
Labor, and 
Natural Resources
Exports Consumption
 
 
Figure C1.1 The Flow of Production 
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Table C1.1 Substitution elasticities in the model 
 Armington elasticity, 
domestic/imported 
Armington elasticity, 
allocation of imports 
CES elasticity of 
substitution primary factors
Cereals 2.2 4.4 0.3 
Vegetable 2.2 4.4 0.2 
Oilseeds 2.2 4.4 0.6 
Sugar 2.2 4.4 0.6 
Cotton 2.2 4.4 0.2 
oCrops 2.2 4.4 0.2 
Animal 2.6 5.5 0.2 
proFOOD 2.4 4.8 1.1 
Extract 2.8 5.6 0.2 
Light 2.7 6 1.3 
Industry 2.9 6 1.3 
Trade 1.9 3.8 1.7 
Services 1.9 3.9 1.3 
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Appendix D Results Tables 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 1 National income gains under trade reform a) 
 
 
 Million 1997 USD Per cent of GDP 
   
 Little Modest Full Little Modest Full 
 
 
nAfrica 67 625 1,775 0.0 0.3 0.9 
SSA -540 -502 704 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 
sAfrica -132 93 1,233 -0.1 0.1 0.9 
EU15 7,996 12,226 15,860 0.1 0.2 0.2 
NAM 1,000 543 253 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SAM 1,855 3,559 8,181 0.1 0.2 0.4 
AUSNZ 687 1,279 4,629 0.2 0.3 1.0 
HiASIA 4,470 11,115 23,965 0.1 0.2 0.5 
China 1,648 3,285 6,533 0.2 0.3 0.7 
oASIA 1,649 3,311 5,893 0.1 0.3 0.5 
CEEC 113 139 -33 0.0 0.1 0.0 
ROW 2,274 3,999 15,173 0.1 0.2 0.8 
Total 21,087 39,672 84,164 0.1 0.1 0.3 
 
 
a) Based on the measure of equivalent variation. 
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 2 The terms of trade, % change after reform 
 
 
  Reform scenario 
  
 Little Modest Full 
 
 
North Africa -0.3 -0.9 -2.2 
Sub-Sahara Africa -0.3 -0.7 -1 
Southern Africa -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
EU-15 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 
US/Canada -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 
South America 0.2 0.1 0.3 
Australia/New Zealand 0.7 1.2 5 
High-income Asia 0.1 0.5 0.9 
China 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Other Asia 0.2 0.1 -0.1 
Transition countries -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 
Rest of world 0.2 0.2 0 
 
 
Source: model simulations. 
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Appendix Table 3 Output, Exports and Imports (mln USD 1997) 
 
 
 Output[S1] Export[S2] Import[S3] 
    
 nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica 
 
 
Cereals 14,859 30,056 1,537 147 161 239 3,432 1,283 291 
Vegetable 10,003 10,061 1,703 663 840 736 397 200 56 
Oilseeds 1,935 4,605 1,083 347 435 81 1,650 579 386 
Sugar 6,508 4,766 993 54 613 308 853 644 42 
Cotton 1,767 2,767 52 59 1,515 31 164 46 38 
Other Crops 527 14,214 1,040 87 5,832 166 548 207 127 
Animal 23,870 10,633 5,234 166 160 218 207 69 93 
proFood 21,525 23,959 17,316 1,074 2,348 1,105 2,556 2,939 885 
Extract 36,365 43,998 15,363 18,168 26,582 4,057 1,771 1,636 1,689 
Light 46,837 19,143 16,045 6,885 2,958 2,703 7,818 4,918 2,828 
Industry 75,132 36,269 63,089 9,393 7,933 19,716 28,927 31,339 20,855 
Trade 57,053 75,607 51,135 5,425 4,064 3,052 2,929 13,715 2,673 
Other 140,233 101,630 100,000 8,025 4,256 2,192 6,712 7,379 2,242 
Services 
Total 436,615 377,708 274,590 50,492 57697 34604 57963 64,956 32,204 
 
 
Source: GTAP database version 5.3 (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002). 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 4 African Export Volume, % change to the baseline 
 
 
 Little Modest Full 
    
 nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica 
 
 
Cereals 28.7 18.5 7.1 59.6 39.6 15.3 157.7 110.4 53.0 
Vegetable -1.7 -8.0 -8.8 -1.6 -11.7 -13.3 19.9 -2.7 -7.4 
Oilseeds 11.8 6.7 -1.2 18.3 15.3 -2.5 48.9 52.9 16.5 
Sugar  29.7 7.1 6.7 46.5 24.4 15.5 170.9 113.3 73.8 
Cotton 5.8 6.4 5.7 17.3 18.2 13.7 55.5 44.8 32.1 
Other Crops -4.1 -4.9 -3.3 -6.8 -6.9 -5.4 2.1 -5.2 -8.1 
Animal 13.6 6.5 4.2 33.2 21.9 17.8 114.6 76.3 44.4 
proFood 5.9 -4.2 -1.9 17.0 -2.1 -1.0 80.8 32.8 45.7 
Extract 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 4.2 3.1 2.9 
Light -0.2 1.5 1.4 7.5 6.0 5.9 27.6 13.3 14.5 
Industry 0.5 1.6 0.7 5.3 7.2 3.0 21.5 18.1 7.5 
Trade 0.6 1.4 0.8 1.0 3.5 1.5 3.2 6.6 2.1 
Other Services 0.4 1.4 0.7 0.8 2.7 0.8 3.4 3.4 -0.4 
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Appendix Table 5 Imports into Africa, % change to the baseline 
 
 
 Little Modest Full 
    
 nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica 
 
 
Cereals -5.7 -6.2 -4.3 -11.7 -12.3 -8.6 -16.3 -9.2 -3.3 
Vegetable 3.3 2.5 0.0 5.4 4.0 0.4 37.2 25.8 25.4 
Oilseeds -0.1 0.4 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 -0.7 9.3 20.5 16.7 
Sugar  -2.6 -3.8 0.5 -6.4 -9.5 1.3 8.1 -2.0 60.9 
Cotton -2.8 -0.4 -0.2 -8.7 -4.0 0.5 -14.9 -5.2 7.4 
Other Crops 0.4 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.5 3.0 9.8 24.4 14.6 
Animal -1.0 -0.3 -0.2 -5.6 -4.1 -2.1 13.1 1.2 -2.0 
proFood -1.5 -1.4 -0.8 -5.5 -5.0 -2.9 27.3 11.6 41.3 
Extract -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.2 1.2 2.3 0.3 
Light 2.3 1.9 1.8 12.7 12.1 10.7 32.9 33.7 30.3 
Industry 1.8 0.8 0.8 9.2 5.8 5.4 22.6 15.9 14.9 
Trade -0.2 -0.9 -0.4 0.0 -1.4 -0.4 -0.5 -1.4 0.5 
Other Services 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 0.8 1.1 -0.1 1.1 5.0 1.4 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 6 Prices of Imported Goods (CIF-Price, % change) 
 
 
 Little Modest Full 
    
 nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica 
 
 
Cereals 4.2 3.3 3.2 9.4 7.2 7.1 17.6 12.3 13.5 
Vegetable -1.0 -1.2 -0.2 -1.4 -1.8 -0.1 -2.3 -2.2 0.1 
Oilseeds 0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.7 -0.1 0.6 0.9 -2.4 0.9 
Sugar  2.0 2.1 0.0 4.9 5.3 0.0 8.9 9.7 0.0 
Cotton 2.2 0.1 -0.1 6.5 0.5 0.0 13.9 1.3 0.3 
Other Crops -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -1.3 -1.6 -1.6 
Animal 1.0 0.3 0.4 3.5 2.1 1.6 8.9 5.0 4.4 
proFood 1.3 0.8 0.7 3.7 2.6 2.0 7.1 5.0 4.2 
Extract 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 
Light -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -1.1 -0.8 -0.7 
Industry -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 
Trade 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 -0.2 1.1 -0.1 
Other Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 
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Appendix Table 7 Output (% change in value-terms) 
 
 
 Little Modest Full 
    
 nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica 
 
 
Cereals 1.7 0.3 2.0 4.0 0.8 4.8 4.3 1.4 9.3 
Vegetable -0.3 -0.9 -3.8 -0.3 -1.3 -5.7 -1.1 -0.8 -3.8 
Oilseeds 1.2 0.4 -0.6 2.3 1.4 -0.7 -3.1 2.4 -9.3 
Sugar  0.5 1.4 2.2 1.5 5.4 5.4 -1.1 17.6 21.7 
Cotton 0.5 2.5 2.7 2.1 6.4 7.0 3.8 15.8 13.1 
Other Crops -2.2 -2.3 -0.8 -3.4 -3.2 -1.1 -12.9 -2.7 -2.1 
Animal 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.3 1.7 2.3 
proFood 0.3 -0.6 -0.2 1.6 0.1 0.1 -3.8 0.9 0.3 
Extract 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.6 
Light -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 -1.4 -4.0 -1.5 -0.7 -9.9 -3.6 
Industry -0.7 -0.8 -0.1 -2.8 -3.6 -0.5 -5.6 -8.3 -1.0 
Trade 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Other Services 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 1.0 0.3 0.2 2.3 1.6 1.0 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 8 Factor and Producer Prices (% change) 
 
 
 Little Modest Full 
    
 nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica nAfrica SSA sAfrica 
 
 
Factor Prices 
Land 2.0 -2.4 -2.7 6.4 -1.6 -0.6 5.0 3.8 8.2 
Unskilled Labour a) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skilled Labour a) 0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.8 -0.1 0.1 1.7 1.1 1.1 
Capital 0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.7 -0.3 0.0 1.1 0.6 0.8 
Producer Prices 
Cereals 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.2 -0.6 0.5 
Vegetable 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 
Oilseeds 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 -0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -1.0 -2.7 
Sugar 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.6 -1.0 -0.1 -0.2 -1.7 -0.1 
Cotton 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.8 
OCrops -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.1 -1.0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.2 0.0 
Animal 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -1.2 -0.5 0.0 
ProFood 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 
Extract 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.7 0.3 0.1 
Light -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.9 -1.3 -0.8 -2.8 -2.7 -1.7 
Industry -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.8 -1.4 -0.5 -2.1 -3.0 -0.9 
Trade 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -1.3 -0.2 
Services -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -0.3 -1.1 -1.1 -0.2 
 
 
a) Refers to the real wage rate. 
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Appendix Table 9 Unskilled Employment (% change in the number employed) 
 
 
 Little Modest Full 
 
 
nAfrica 0.1 0.7 1.0 
SSA -0.5 -0.4 0.7 
sAfrica -0.2 0.0 1.0 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 10 Welfare impact of policies under 'Little reform' (USD mln) a) 
 
 
 Export Agricultural Non-Agricultural Domestic Trade Total 
 Subsidy Market Access Market Access Support Facilitation 
 
 
nAfrica Africa 0 0 -42 -1 89 47 
 OECD -36 197 -260 117 10 27 
 Rest  -3 0 -16 8 4 -8 
 Total -39 197 -318 125 102 67 
SSA Africa -7 0 35 -6 24 47 
 OECD -6 -242 -115 -225 1 -587 
 Rest  7 0 -13 10 -3 0 
 Total -6 -242 -93 -221 23 -540 
sAfrica Africa -20 0 154 0 30 164 
 OECD 6 -125 -246 79 5 -282 
 Rest  3 0 -29 10 2 -14 
 Total -11 -125 -121 89 36 -132 
 
 
a) Based on Equivalent Variation. 
 
 
Appendix Table 11 Welfare impact of policies under 'Modest reform' (USD mln) a) 
 
 
 Export Agricultural Non-Agricultural Domestic Trade Total 
 Subsidy Market Access Market Access Support Facilitation 
 
 
nAfrica Africa 1 0 -354 -1 136 -220 
 OECD -91 391 309 260 14 883 
 Rest  -8 0 -57 21 5 -39 
 Total -98 391 -102 280 155 625 
SSA Africa -18 0 76 -14 38 82 
 OECD -9 -175 -266 -128 4 -573 
 Rest  17 0 -49 25 -4 -11 
 Total -10 -175 -238 -117 38 -502 
sAfrica Africa -50 0 730 0 45 725 
 OECD 16 -139 -602 193 7 -526 
 Rest  7 0 -142 26 3 -105 
 Total -27 -139 -14 220 54 93 
 
 
a) Based on Equivalent Variation. 
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Appendix Table 12 Welfare impact of policies under 'Full reform' (USD mln) a) 
 
 
 Export Agricultural Non-Agricultural Domestic Trade Total 
 Subsidy Market Access Market Access Support Facilitation 
 
 
nAfrica Africa 1 -776 -1370 -2 284 -1863 
 OECD -149 1208 1888 516 28 3491 
 Rest  -20 146 -30 41 11 148 
 Total -168 578 488 555 322 1775 
SSA Africa -38 -644 -213 -30 78 -847 
 OECD 0 1419 -384 302 16 1352 
 Rest  42 158 -48 57 -10 198 
 Total 4 933 -645 328 84 704 
sAfrica Africa -114 17 1638 1 95 1636 
 OECD 49 231 -915 394 14 -228 
 Rest  19 89 -341 54 4 -175 
 Total -46 336 381 449 113 1233 
 
 
a) Based on Equivalent Variation. 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 13 National income gains under alternative model specification (USD mln) a) 
 
 
 Static Model Dynamic Model 
   
 Little Modest Full Little Modest Full 
 
 
nAfrica 67 625 1,775 170 744 1,767 
SSA -540 -502 704 -499 419 4,331 
sAfrica -132 93 1,233 -124 47 1,771 
EU15 7,996 12,226 15,860 14,554 26,819 41,647 
NAM 1,000 543 253 2,183 4,570 9,988 
SAM 1,855 3,559 8,181 5,249 13,020 30,552 
AUSNZ 687 1,279 4,629 1,471 2,982 10,107 
HiASIA 4,470 11,115 23,965 5,878 16,060 32,582 
China 1,648 3,285 6,533 2,640 5,230 9,927 
oASIA 1,649 3,311 5,893 4,963 12,801 24,519 
CEEC 113 139 -33 130 481 281 
ROW 2,274 3,999 15,173 5,077 14,118 33,617 
Total 21,087 39,672 84,164 41,692 97,291 201,089 
 
 
a) Based on Equivalent Variation. 
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Appendix Table 14 Capital stock effects 
 
 
 Per cent change in capital stock 
  
 Little Modest Full 
 
 
nAfrica 0.3 1.4 2.3 
SSA 0.0 1.6 5.5 
sAfrica 0.0 0.6 2.7 
EU15 0.2 0.4 0.7 
NAM 0.0 0.1 0.2 
SAM 0.5 1.3 3.1 
AUSNZ 0.6 1.2 3.7 
HiASIA 0.1 0.4 0.6 
China 0.4 0.8 1.4 
oAsia 0.8 2.3 4.6 
CEEC 0.0 0.2 0.0 
ROW 0.6 2.0 3.5 
WORLD 0.2 0.6 1.2 
 
 
 
